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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
9 AT TACOMA

10 KEZIA E. RAMSEY,

11 Plaintiff,

12 v.

13 CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
14 Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration,

15 Defendant.
16

CASE NO. 13-cv-05955 JRC

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S
COMPLAINT

17 This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Fed. R. Civ. P. 73 and
18 Local Magistrate Judge Rule MJR 13 (*see also* Notice of Initial Assignment to a U.S.
19 Magistrate Judge and Consent Form, Dkt. No. 5; Consent to Proceed Before a United
20 States Magistrate Judge, Dkt. No. 6). This matter has been fully briefed (*see* Dkt. Nos.
21 14, 15, 16).

22 After considering and reviewing the record, the Court finds that the ALJ erred by
23 failing to adopt or specifically reject the opinion of examining psychologist Tasmyn
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1 Bowes, PsyD, that plaintiff would have marked/severe limitation in her ability to perform
2 activities within a schedule and maintain regular punctual attendance. Dr. Bowes’
3 opinion may be significant because the vocational expert testified that if an individual
4 were absent “at least three days a month” they would not be able to perform competitive
5 work (Tr. 76).

6 BACKGROUND

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8 Plaintiff, KEZIA E. RAMSEY, was born in 1983 and was 16 years old on the
9 alleged date of disability onset of July 20, 1999 (*see* Tr. 148-51). Plaintiff was
10 homeschooled and graduated from high school (Tr. 35). Plaintiff has worked at one
11 part-time job as a payroll assistant that lasted about three months (Tr. 38-39).

12 According to the ALJ, plaintiff has at least the severe impairments of “anxiety
13 disorder, panic disorder with agoraphobia, major depressive disorder, somatization
14 disorder, and headaches (20 CFR 416.920(c))” (Tr. 14).

15 At the time of the hearing, plaintiff was living with her mother (Tr. 34-35).

16 PROCEDURAL HISTORY

17 Plaintiff’s application Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) benefits pursuant to
18 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a) (Title XVI) of the Social Security Act was denied initially and
19 following reconsideration (*see* Tr. 81-84, 88-89, *see also* 148-51). Plaintiff’s requested
20 hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge Rebekah Ross (“the ALJ”) on May 7,
21 2012 (*see* Tr. 30-78). On May 21, 2012, the ALJ issued a written decision in which the
22 ALJ concluded that plaintiff was not disabled pursuant to the Social Security Act (*see* Tr.
23 9-29).
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1 In plaintiff's Opening Brief, plaintiff raises the following issues: (1) Whether or
2 not the ALJ properly evaluated the medical evidence; (2) Whether or not the ALJ
3 properly evaluated plaintiff's testimony; (3) Whether or not the ALJ properly evaluated
4 the lay evidence; (4) Whether or not the ALJ properly assessed plaintiff's residual
5 functional capacity; and (5) Whether or not the ALJ erred by basing her step five finding
6 on a residual functional capacity assessment that did not include all of plaintiff's
7 limitations (*see* Dkt. No. 14, p. 1).

8 STANDARD OF REVIEW

9 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court may set aside the Commissioner's
10 denial of social security benefits if the ALJ's findings are based on legal error or not
11 supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. *Bayliss v. Barnhart*, 427 F.3d
12 1211, 1214 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005) (*citing Tidwell v. Apfel*, 161 F.3d 599, 601 (9th Cir.
13 1999)).

14 DISCUSSION

15 Among other errors, plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in her assessment of the
16 medical opinion of examining psychologist Tasmyn Bowes, PsyD. Dkt. No. 14, pp. 3-7.
17 Specifically, plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by failing to adopt or reject Dr. Bowes'
18 opinion that plaintiff had a "marked/severe" impairment in the ability to perform
19 activities within a schedule and maintain regular punctual attendance (*see* Tr. 317). Dr.
20 Bowes' provided no definition for a "marked/severe" limitation (*see* Tr. 315-24 (noting
21 "1=Mild; 2=Moderate; 3=Mraked/Severe [sic]; 4=Indeterminable"). A limitation in the
22 ability to maintain regular punctual attendance could be significant because the
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1 vocational expert (“VE”) testified that if an individual were absent “at least three days a
2 month” they would not be able to perform competitive work (Tr. 76). Here, the ALJ
3 provided no reason to reject Dr. Bowes’ opinion regarding plaintiff’s difficulty with
4 performing activities within a schedule and maintaining regular punctual attendance in a
5 work setting (*see* Tr. 22).

6 The ALJ must provide “clear and convincing” reasons for rejecting the
7 uncontradicted opinion of an examining psychologist. *Lester v. Chater*, 81 F.3d 821, 830
8 (9th Cir. 1996) (*citing Embrey v. Bowen*, 849 F.2d 418, 422 (9th Cir. 1988); *Pitzer v.*
9 *Sullivan*, 908 F.2d 502, 506 (9th Cir. 1990)). When a treating or examining physician’s
10 opinion is contradicted, that opinion can be rejected “for specific and legitimate reasons
11 that are supported by substantial evidence in the record.” *Lester*, 81 F.3d at 830-31
12 (*citing Andrews v. Shalala*, 53 F.3d 1035, 1043 (9th Cir. 1995); *Murray v. Heckler*, 722
13 F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1983)).

14 Moreover, the ALJ must explain why her own interpretations, rather than those of
15 the doctors, are correct. *Reddick v. Chater*, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998) (*citing*
16 *Embrey*, 849 F.2d at 421-22). The Commissioner “may not reject ‘significant probative
17 evidence’ without explanation.” *Flores v. Shalala*, 49 F.3d 562, 570-71 (9th Cir. 1995)
18 (*quoting Vincent v. Heckler*, 739 F.2d 1393, 1395 (9th Cir. 1984) (*quoting Cotter v.*
19 *Harris*, 642 F.2d 700, 706-07 (3d Cir. 1981))). The “ALJ’s written decision must state
20 reasons for disregarding [such] evidence.” *Flores*, 49 F.3d at 571.
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23 Defendant argues that the ALJ did not err because the ALJ’s residual functional
24 capacity (“RFC”) finding reasonably accommodated Dr. Bowes opinion by including the

1 limitation that plaintiff would be off-task ten-percent of the time (*see* Tr. 17). Dkt. No.
2 15, pp. 5-7. Defendant’s argument is not persuasive. Although the VE testified that an
3 individual who was off task ten-percent of the time would be able to perform the jobs
4 relied on by the ALJ at step-five to find plaintiff not disabled (*see* Tr. 24, 72-74), the VE
5 provided no testimony regarding the impact of tardiness or difficulty performing
6 activities within a schedule on an individual’s ability to maintain competitive
7 employment (*see generally* Tr. 71-77). Moreover, although Dr. Bowes did not define a
8 “marked/severe” limitation, this Court is not persuaded that such a limitation is
9 reasonably accommodated by a finding that an individual would be off-task only ten-
10 percent of the time.
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12 As defendant observes, it is noteworthy that although the ALJ provided no reason
13 to reject Dr. Bowes’ opinion that plaintiff would have marked/severe limitations in
14 performing activities within a schedule and maintaining regular punctual attendance, the
15 ALJ did provide a reason to reject Dr. Bowes’ opinion that plaintiff would have a
16 marked/severe limitation in completing a normal work day and workweek without
17 interruptions from psychologically based symptoms (*see* Tr. 22). The ALJ rejected this
18 opinion because “it is unpersuasive and inconsistent with the record, particularly the
19 therapy reports detailing [plaintiff’s] actual functioning, as discussed above.” Tr. 22.
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21 Assuming without deciding that the ALJ’s rationale for rejecting Dr. Bowes’
22 opinion regarding plaintiff’s ability to complete a normal workday and workweek also
23 extends to Dr. Bowes’ opinion regarding plaintiff’s ability to perform activities within a
24 schedule and maintain attendance, the rationale offered by the ALJ to reject Dr. Bowes’

1 opinion nonetheless is not a specific and legitimate reason supported by substantial
2 evidence in the record.¹ See *Lester*, 81 F.3d at 830-31.


3 As defendant points out, inconsistency with the record can be a specific and
4 legitimate reason for rejecting the opinion of an examining psychologist. Dkt. No. 15,
5 pp. 5-7 (citing *Batson v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin.*, 359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir.
6 2004)). The ALJ can reject such an opinion by “setting out a detailed and thorough
7 summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof,
8 and making findings.” *Reddick*, 157 F.3d at 725 (citing *Magallanes v. Bowen*, 881 F.2d
9 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989)). Here, the ALJ cited inconsistency with “therapy reports
10 detailing [plaintiff’s] actual functioning” as the basis for rejecting Dr. Bowes’ opinion
11 (Tr. 22). In rejecting this evidence, however, the ALJ points to no specific inconsistency
12 between the therapy reports and plaintiff’s ability to perform activities within a schedule
13 or maintain attendance. The ALJ’s summary of plaintiff’s therapy reports is similarly
14 unrevealing.
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16 In summarizing the medical evidence, the ALJ notes that therapy reports indicated
17 plaintiff: drove a few times on her own from Seattle to Olympia with some difficulty (Tr.
18 19-20 (citing Tr. 276, 295, 301)); used a hula-hoop and jump rope to stay active and
19 decrease anxiety (Tr. 19 (citing (301)); began plans on a business venture in another part
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22 ¹Although the parties do not clearly address the applicable legal standard for rejecting the
23 opinion of examining psychologist Dr. Bowes, plaintiff concedes that the specific and legitimate
24 standard applies to the ALJ’s assessment of the nearly identical medical opinion of examining
psychologist Terilee Wingate, PhD, regarding plaintiff’s ability to sustain a work schedule (see
Tr. 216, 262). Dkt No. 14, p. 5.

1 **JUDGMENT** should be for **PLAINTIFF** and the case should be closed.

2 Dated this 13th day of August, 2014.

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5 J. Richard Creatura
6 United States Magistrate Judge
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