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8	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON	
9	AT TAC	OMA
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11	PAUL MOSELEY,	CASE NO. 3:14-cv-05802-RJB
12	Plaintiff,	ORDER:
13	v.	(1) GRANTING DEFENDANT CITIMORTGAGE, INC.'S
14	CITIMORTGAGE, INC.,	MOTION TO DISMISS AND
15	Defendant.	(2) DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE AND
16		MOTION TO DENY DEFENDANT CITIMORTGAGE,
17		INC.'S MOTION TO DISMISS
18	This matter comes before the Court on defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 23) and on	
19	plaintiff's "Motion to Strike [Defendant's] False S	tatements Contained in Its Motion to Dismiss
20	Pursuant Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 12 (f) and Deny [De	fendant's] Motion to Dismiss" (Dkt. 24). The
21	Court has considered the pleadings filed in support of, and in opposition to, the motions and the	
22	file herein.	
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1	PROCEDURAL HISTORY
2	Proceeding on his second amended complaint for "Satisfaction of CitiMortgage Lien that
3	Encumbers Personal Real Property," plaintiff seeks to have the Court discharge his debt to
4	defendant because defendant refused to accept plaintiff's payment. Dkt. 15. In addition, plaintiff
5	alleges claims under the Federal Debt Collection Practices ("FDCPA") and the Fair Credit
6	Reporting ("FCRA") acts. Id.
7	On January 15, 2015, defendant filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's action for failure to
8	state any claim. Dkt. 23.
9	On January 28, 2015, plaintiff filed a motion to strike defendant's allegedly false
10	statements contained in defendant's motion to dismiss and to deny defendant's motion to
11	dismiss. Dkt. 24. In addition, on February 6, 2015, plaintiff filed a response to defendant's
12	motion to dismiss. Dkt. 27.
13	On February 13, 2015, defendant filed a reply.
14	RELEVANT FACTS
15	On March 2, 2008, plaintiff borrowed \$262,500.00 from, and executed a promissory note
16	for the same payable to, CitiMortgage, Inc. ("CitiMortgage"). Dkt. 15, at 10-34. The note was
17	secured by a Deed of Trust ("DOT"), identifying CitiMortgage as the Lender and plaintiff and
18	his wife as the Borrower. Id., at 11. Plaintiff's last payment on the note appears to have been
19	made in October 2010. Id., at 3.
20	On May 5, 2011, before plaintiff filed this action, plaintiff sued CitiMortgage to, inter
21	alia, quite title in the property, alleging RESPA and TILA violations. Moseley v. CitiMortgage
22	Inc., C11-5349RJB, 2011 WL 5175598 (W.D.Wash.2011) aff'd, 564 Fed. Appx. 300 (9th Cir.
23	2014). This Court granted CitiMortgage's motion for a summary judgment, dismissing all
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plaintiff's claims. On August 25, 2014, the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.
 Moseley v. CitiMortgage Inc., 564 Fed. Appx. 300 (9th Cir. 2014).

3 On October 9, 2014, six weeks later, plaintiff filed the present action, which, in fact, arose in 2012. On February 16, 2012, plaintiff mailed CitiMortgage via certified mail a personal 4 5 check for \$283,839.00, the loan's payoff amount at the time. Dkt. 15. Plaintiff had written "EFT Only" and "FOR DISCHARGE of DEBT" on the check. Id., at 36. On February 20, 2012, 6 CitiMortgage refused plaintiff's payment, requiring certified funds instead. Id., at 41. Instead of 7 tendering any other payment to CitiMortgage, plaintiff filed the present action, alleging that the 8 9 debt has been discharged to the extent of the payment's amount because CitiMortgage refused to accept plaintiff's payment. 10

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MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD

12 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) motions to dismiss may be based on either the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri 13 v. Pacifica Police Department, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). Material allegations are taken 14 as admitted and the complaint is construed in the plaintiff's favor. Keniston v. Roberts, 717 F.2d 15 1295 (9th Cir. 1983). "While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does 16 17 not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the 18 elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 19 201964-65 (2007) (internal citations omitted). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right 21 to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Id. at 1965. Plaintiffs must allege "enough facts to state a 22 claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 1974. 23

1	Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d), if, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside
2	the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one
3	for summary judgment under Rule 56. However, when a plaintiff has attached various exhibits to
4	the complaint, those exhibits may be considered in determining whether dismissal was proper
5	without converting the motion to one for summary judgment. Cooper v. Bell, 628 F.2d 1208,
6	1210 n. 2 (9th Cir.1980). Accordingly, the Court has confined itself to plaintiff's second
7	amended complaint (Dkt. 15) and exhibits attached thereto. The Court has considered no other
8	matters outside the pleadings, including the exhibits plaintiff attached to his response to
9	defendant's motion to dismiss and, therefore, need not treat defendant's motion to dismiss as one
10	for summary judgment.
11	DISCUSSION
12	A. Plaintiff's separate motions to strike statements contained in CitiMortgage's motion to dismiss and to deny CitiMortgage's motion to dismiss
13	Before plaintiff filed his response to CitiMortgage's motion to dismiss, plaintiff filed a
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15	motion to (a) strike some of CitiMortgage's statements contained in CitiMortgage's motion to
16	dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P 12(f); and (b) deny CitiMortgage's motion to dismiss. Dkt. 24. In
17	response, CitiMortgage objects to plaintiff filing two responsive briefs. Dkt. 29.
18	Under LCR 7(g), "[r]equests to strike material contained in or attached to submissions of
18	opposing parties shall not be presented in a separate motion to strike, but shall instead be
	included in the responsive brief, and will be considered with the underlying motion." However,
20	"[t]his rule does not limit a party's ability to file a motion to strike otherwise permitted by the
21	Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) motions to strike material in
22	pleadings." LCR 7(g)(5). Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f), the Court "may strike from a pleading an
23 24	insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter."

1	Here, in a separate motion to strike, plaintiff requests that the Court strike some of
2	CitiMortgage's statements contained in CitiMortgage's motion to dismiss and that the Court
3	deny CitiMortgage's motion to dismiss. None of the identified statements constitute any
4	insufficient defenses or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.
5	Accordingly, the Court should deny plaintiff's separate motions.
6	B. Plaintiff's claim relating to any discharge of debt
7	In his complaint, plaintiff relies on the U.C.C. § 3-603, codified in Washington under
8	RCW 62A.3-603, which states, in pertinent part, as follows:
9	"If tender of payment of an obligation to pay an instrument is made to a person entitled to enforce the instrument and the tender is refused, there is discharge, to the extent of the
10	amount of the tender, of the obligation of an indorser or accommodation party having a right of recourse with respect to the obligation to which the tender relates."
11	RCW 62A.3-603(b). Plaintiff's complaint asserts that "[b]ecause [CitiMortgage] refused the
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13	tender, there is discharge, to the extent of the amount of the tender." Dkt. 15, at 5.
14	CitiMortgage argues that plaintiff has failed to state any claim because, under the DOT,
15	CitiMortgage may demand certified funds from a defaulted borrower. Dkt. 23.
16	In response, plaintiff concedes that CitiMortgage has the right to demand certified funds.
10	Dkt. 27, at 10. Plaintiff argues, however, that he tried to pay CitiMortgage using certified funds,
17	not a personal check. Id., at 2. More specifically, plaintiff argues that the check in question "was
10	ordered to be executed as an EFT (reverse wire transfer) which makes it 'certified funds'" and
20	"ready for release" (Id., at 3) and that, under the DOT, a wire transfer is an acceptable form of
20	certified funds (Id., at 8). Plaintiff further argues that he received no notice that a certain form of
	payment would be required. Id., at 10.
22	In reply, CitiMortgage argues that plaintiff has failed to allege any facts plausibly
23	showing that the check in question constituted certified funds. Dkt. 29.
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1 Under Fed. R. Civ. P 12(b)(6), plaintiff has failed to state a claim for discharge of his 2 debt under the promissory note and the DOT. First, U.C.C. § 3-603, codified in Washington 3 under RCW 62A.3-603, does not apply to this case. Under this statute's official comment, "refusal of a tender of payment discharges any indorser or accommodation party having a right 4 of recourse against the party making the tender." U.C.C. § 3-603, Comment. This statute relates 5 6 to the rights of indorsers or accommodation parties as these rights relate to the party making the 7 tender. Plaintiff, as the party making the tender, can have no right of recourse against himself. As such, plaintiff is not an indorser or accommodation party within this statute's meaning. 8 9 Accordingly, this statute has no bearing on this case.

10 Second, even if RCW 62A.3-603 applies to this case, the parties have modified or supplemented plaintiff's statutory obligation, if any, to pay the debt in question when they 11 12 executed the DOT, precluding any discharge of plaintiff's debt under these circumstances. 13 Specifically, under RCW 62A.3-117, "the obligation of a party to an instrument to pay the instrument may be modified, supplemented, or nullified by a separate agreement of the obligor 14 15 and a person entitled to enforce the instrument, if the instrument is issued or the obligation is incurred in reliance on the agreement or as part of the same transaction giving rise to the 16 17 agreement." See also U.C.C. § 3-117.

Here, under the DOT, CitiMortgage could have required that plaintiff pay off his debt
with cash, money order, certified check, bank check treasurer's check or cashier's check, or an
Electronic Funds Transfer. Dkt. 15, at 21-22. Although plaintiff argues that the check in question
was certified funds because plaintiff "ordered" it to be executed as an Electronic Funds Transfer,
an Electronic Funds Transfer, under the DOT, is "any transfer of funds, other than a transaction
originated by check, draft, or similar paper instrument..." *Id.*, at 12. Originated by check,

plaintiff's payment was not an Electronic Funds Transfer under the DOT. Nor was it a certified
 funds payment. Finally, rules of statutory construction militate against plaintiff's interpretation
 of the statute because any such interpretation would lead to an absurd result.

Accordingly, plaintiff has failed to properly pay his debt. The Court should conclude that
plaintiff has failed to state a claim under U.C.C. § 3-603 and its Washington counterpart.

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C. Plaintiff's FDCPA claim

CitiMortgage argues that plaintiff has failed to state a claim under FDCPA because
CitiMortgage is not a debt collector within FDCPA's meaning. Dkt. 23. In response, plaintiff
insists that CitiMortgage is a debt collector because "[CitiMortgage's] own documentation states
they are attempting to collect a debt..." Dkt. 27, at 3.

This Court has already ruled that CitiMortgage is not a debt collector. *Moseley*, 2011 WL
5175598, at 4. Accordingly, plaintiff's FDCPA claim is without merit.

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D. Plaintiff's FCRA claim

CitiMortgage argues that plaintiff has failed to identify any statute CitiMortgage
allegedly violated or why any of CitiMortgage's credit reporting was incorrect. Dkt. 23.
In response, plaintiff asserts claims under "RESPA, duties of a servicer codified as 12
U.S.C. §2605e(3)," and "FDCPA codified as 15 USC 1692." Dkt. 27, at 5. Plaintiff alleges that,
"while [CitiMortgage] repeatedly refused to response to [plaintiff's] questions, [CitiMortgage]
wasted no time furnishing the major credit companies with the undisputed credit reporting
delinquencies in question." *Id.*, at 4.

In reply, CitiMortgage argues that plaintiff's second amended complaint has failed to not only specify any basis for alleging any adverse credit reporting claims, but also allege any facts

suggesting that CitiMortgage improperly reported any default to any credit reporting agency.
 Dkt. 29, at 7.

To the extent that plaintiff alleges a RESPA violation for CitiMortgage's alleged failure
to respond to his requests, this Court has already concluded that plaintiff has failed to state any
such claim. *Moseley*, 2011 WL 5175598, at *9. To the extent that plaintiff has asserted any
FCRA claim, plaintiff has insufficiently pleaded such a claim. Plaintiff has failed to allege any
facts suggesting that CitiMortgage improperly reported default to any credit reporting agency.

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CONCLUSION

Plaintiff's complaint is without merit. The Court should dismiss plaintiff's complaint for
failure to state any legally cognizable claim with no leave to amend. The Court should order that,
if plaintiff files any documents in this case in the future, the Clerk will docket, but the Court will
not act upon, any such documents. If plaintiff appeals this order and/or dismissal of this case, this
Court should deny any *in forma pauperis* status without prejudice to plaintiff to file an
application to proceed *in forma pauperis* with the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.

15 Therefore, it is hereby **ORDERED** that

16 Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 23) is **GRANTED**.

Plaintiff's Motion to Strike CMI's False Statements Contained in Its Motion to Dismiss
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 12 (f) and Deny CMI's Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 24) is

19 **DENIED**.

This case is **DISMISSED** with prejudice.

If plaintiff files any documents in this case in the future, the Clerk will docket, but the
Court will not act upon, any such documents.

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1	The Clerk is directed to send uncertified copies of this Order to all counsel of record and	
2	to any party appearing pro se at said party's last known address.	
3	Dated this 19th day of February, 2015.	
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5	Naker 7 Duyan	
6	ROBERT J. BRYAN United States District Judge	
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