1

1		HONORABLE RONALD B. LEIGHTON
2		
3		
4		
5		
6	UNITED STATES D	ISTRICT COURT
7	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA	
8 9	HUGHES GROUP, LLC, a Washington limited liability company,	CASE NO. 15-CV-05177-RBL
10	Plaintiff,	ORDER DENYING MOTION TO VACATE ARBITRATION AWARD
11	V.	AND GRANTING MOTION TO CONFIRM ARBITRATION AWARD
12	DOSS AVIATION, INC., a Texas corporation,	[DKT. #11 & #13]
13	Defendant.	
14		
15	I. INTRO	DDUCTION
16	THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff Hughes Group, LLC's motion to vacate	
17	an arbitration award [Dkt. #11] and Defendant Doss Aviation, Inc.'s cross-motion to confirm the	
18	award [Dkt. #13]. Hughes and Doss teamed up to	win a government contract to wash and
19	maintain aircraft at Joint Base Lewis-McChord. A	dispute arose between the parties while
20	performing the contract, so they went to arbitration	n. The arbitrator found that Hughes had
21	breached the contract and awarded Doss damages	and attorney's fees. Doss seeks an order
22	confirming that award. Hughes contends that the award is in manifest disregard of the law and	
23	must be vacated.	
24		

## II. BACKGROUND

The Department of Defense sets aside a certain number of contracts for service-disabled veteran-owned small businesses. Eligible businesses can team-up with ineligible businesses to perform set-aside contracts, but if at any time the structure of their relationship disqualifies the prime contractor as a service-disabled veteran-owned small business, then the DOD can cancel the contract.

In 2012, Hughes won a set aside contract to perform transient-alert services and aircraft
wash services at Joint Base Lewis-McChord.<sup>1</sup> Hughes subcontracted with Doss, which did not
qualify as a service-disabled veteran-owned small business, to perform the wash services. The
subcontract delineated what tasks each party was going to perform and how they would be paid.

Several months into performance, Hughes reallocated some of the work and started
performing some of the tasks that Doss had been doing. Hughes believed that a provision of the
contract allowed it to do so without Doss's consent to ensure that it continued to be qualified as a
service-disable veteran-owned small business. Doss disagreed with Hughes's interpretation of
the contract, refused to consent to the change, and demanded arbitration.

At arbitration, Doss argued that Hughes materially altered the terms of the contract
without its consent. Hughes contended that it only altered the general scope of the work and
denied altering the terms of the contract.

The arbitrator determined that the subcontract was a requirements contract that gave Doss
the exclusive right to perform all of the aircraft wash services. Based on that determination, the
arbitrator concluded that Hughes impermissibly and radically altered material terms of the

22

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Transient-alert services include coordinating aircraft arrivals and departures, guiding aircraft to parking, placing wheel chocks and stairways, and performing minor maintenance. Wash services include cleaning aircraft 24 interior and exterior, aircraft de-icing, and lubricating aircraft.

1	subcontract without Doss's consent. The arbitrator issued the final award on January 14, 2015,
2	that ordered Hughes to pay Doss \$253,661 in damages and \$221,927 in attorney's fees and
3	costs. Hughes filed a Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award on April 9, 2015. Doss subsequently
4	moved to confirm the arbitration award.
5	III. DISCUSSION
6	Hughes contends that the arbitrator exceeded his power by acting with a manifest
7	disregard of the law. Hughes specifically contends that compliance with the arbitration award
8	would violate regulations that establish who is eligible to perform set-aside contracts. A district
9	court can vacate an arbitration award only if:
10	<ul> <li>(1) the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;</li> <li>(2) there was evident particulate on corruption in the orbitratory, or either of them.</li> </ul>
11	<ul><li>(2) there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them;</li><li>(3) the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing,</li></ul>
12	upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been projudiced; or
13	<ul> <li>any party have been prejudiced; or</li> <li>(4) the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not</li> </ul>
14	made.
15	9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (emphasis added). Arbitrators exceed their power if they issue an award in
16	manifest disregard of the law. Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Services, Inc., 341 F.3d
17	987, 997 (9th Cir. 2003). An arbitrator's award is in manifest disregard of the law only if the
18	arbitrator recognized the applicable law and then ignored it. Michigan Mut. Ins. Co. v. Unigard
19	Sec. Ins. Co., 44 F.3d 826, 832 (9th Cir. 1995).
20	Here, Hughes contends that the arbitrator recognized but ignored the Small Business
21	Administration Ostensible Subcontractor Rule <sup>2</sup> and the Federal Acquisition Regulation 50
22	
23	$^{2}$ The estensible subcontractor rule treats a subcontractor and prime contractor as affiliated if the prime

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The ostensible subcontractor rule treats a subcontractor and prime contractor as affiliated if the prime contractor is "unusually reliant" on the subcontractor, or if the subcontractor performs "primary and vital" requirements of the contract. 13 C.F.R. § 121.103(h)(4).

Percent Rule<sup>3</sup>. Those rules are part of the regulatory scheme that establishes who is eligible to
 perform service-disabled veteran-owned set-aside contracts.

3	Hughes and Doss's subcontract might violate the ostensible subcontract rule and 50
4	percent rule, but that does not mean that the arbitrator acted in manifest disregard of the law by
5	enforcing the parties' agreed-upon terms. This case is fundamentally a contract dispute. The
6	arbitrator did not disregard controlling terms of the contract or ignore rules of interpretation.
7	While complying with the award might disqualify Hughes as a service-disabled veteran-owned
8	small business and cause the DOD to cancel its contract with Hughes, the arbitrator did not act in
9	manifest disregard of the law and the award must be confirmed.
10	CONCLUSION
11	For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff Hughes' Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award (Dkt.
12	#11) is <b>DENIED</b> and Defendant Doss' Motion to Confirm Arbitration Award (Dkt. #13) is
13	GRANTED.
14	Dated this 16 <sup>th</sup> day of July, 2015.
15	
16	Ronald B. Leighton
17	United States District Judge
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	<sup>3</sup> The 50% rule requires that for government set-aside contracts for services, at least 50 percent of the cost of
24	contract performance incurred for personnel must be expended for employees of the prime contractor. 48 C.F.R. 52.219-14(c)(1).