

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT TACOMA

PATRICIA POTTER and WILLIAM H.
POTTER,

Plaintiffs,

v.

AMERICAN FAMILY INSURANCE,

Defendant.

CASE NO. C16-5406 BHS

ORDER DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
DISMISS

13
14
15
16
17

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant American Family Insurance's ("American Family") motion to dismiss extra contractual claims (Dkt. 48). The Court has considered the pleadings filed in support of and in opposition to the motion and the remainder of the file and hereby denies the motion for the reasons stated herein.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

18
19
20
21
22

On May 26, 2016, Plaintiffs Patricia and William Potter ("Potters") filed a complaint against American Family asserting ten causes of action including bad faith insurance practices and violations of Washington's Insurance Fair Conduct Act ("IFCA") and Consumer Protection Act ("CPA"). Dkt. 1.

1 On April 20, 2017, American Family filed a motion to dismiss extra contractual
2 claims. Dkt. 41. On May 8, 2017, the Potters responded. Dkt. 46. On May 12, 2017,
3 American Family replied. Dkt. 48. On May 15, 2017, the Potters filed a surreply. Dkt.
4 50.

5 **II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND**

6 On June 1, 2014, Mrs. Potter was involved in an automobile accident. On June 4,
7 2015, the Potters' attorney submitted a claim to American Family. On August 31, 2015,
8 American Family offered \$46,701.19 to settle the claim. The Potters declined the offer
9 and requested arbitration. On February 29, 2016, the arbitrator awarded the Potters
10 \$130,259.41. This action followed.

11 **III. DISCUSSION**

12 **A. Motion to Strike**

13 In one of many inaccurate statements made to the Court, American Family asserts
14 that “[i]n response to American Family’s motion, the Potters rely solely on the testimony
15 of Robert Dietz.” Dkt. 48 at 9. Contrary to American Family’s assertion, the Potters
16 submitted over 80 pages of exhibits only some of which was Mr. Dietz’s expert report.
17 *See* Dkt. 47-1. Regardless, American Family moves to strike Mr. Dietz’s report in its
18 entirety because it includes improper conclusions of law. Dkt. 48 at 10–11. While
19 American Family is correct that an expert may not provide legal opinions, an expert may
20 opine on the subject of whether an insurance company’s actions fell below industry
21 standards even if those standards are state regulations. *See Hangarter v. Provident Life &*
22 *Acc. Ins. Co.*, 373 F.3d 998, 1017 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[the expert’s] references to California

1 statutory provisions—none of which were directly at issue in the case—were ancillary to
2 the ultimate issue of bad faith.”). Therefore, the Court denies American Family’s motion
3 to strike Mr. Dietz’s report.

4 **B. Motion to Dismiss**

5 As an initial matter on this motion, American Family fails to provide any standard
6 of review to assist in the Court’s evaluation of its motion. At this point of the
7 proceeding, it is unusual to file a motion to dismiss because most dispositive motions are
8 for judgment on the pleadings or for summary judgment. Because American Family
9 submitted evidence in support of its motion and the Potters submitted evidence in support
10 of their response, the Court will convert the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary
11 judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).

12 **1. Standard**

13 Summary judgment is proper only if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure
14 materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
15 fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
16 The moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law when the nonmoving party
17 fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of a claim in the case on which
18 the nonmoving party has the burden of proof. *Celotex Corp. v. Catrett*, 477 U.S. 317,
19 323 (1986). There is no genuine issue of fact for trial where the record, taken as a whole,
20 could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party. *Matsushita Elec.*
21 *Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.*, 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (nonmoving party must
22 present specific, significant probative evidence, not simply “some metaphysical doubt”).

1 | *See also* Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Conversely, a genuine dispute over a material fact exists
2 | if there is sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute, requiring a judge or
3 | jury to resolve the differing versions of the truth. *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477
4 | U.S. 242, 253 (1986); *T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n*, 809 F.2d
5 | 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987).

6 | The determination of the existence of a material fact is often a close question. The
7 | Court must consider the substantive evidentiary burden that the nonmoving party must
8 | meet at trial – e.g., a preponderance of the evidence in most civil cases. *Anderson*, 477
9 | U.S. at 254; *T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc.*, 809 F.2d at 630. The Court must resolve any factual
10 | issues of controversy in favor of the nonmoving party only when the facts specifically
11 | attested by that party contradict facts specifically attested by the moving party. The
12 | nonmoving party may not merely state that it will discredit the moving party’s evidence
13 | at trial, in the hopes that evidence can be developed at trial to support the claim. *T.W.*
14 | *Elec. Serv., Inc.*, 809 F.2d at 630 (relying on *Anderson*, 477 U.S. at 255). Conclusory,
15 | nonspecific statements in affidavits are not sufficient, and missing facts will not be
16 | presumed. *Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n*, 497 U.S. 871, 888-89 (1990).

17 | **2. Claims**

18 | American Family’s arguments to dismiss the Potters’ IFCA claim are based on an
19 | incorrect interpretation of the law. First, American Family contends that “[w]ithout an
20 | actual denial of coverage, an IFCA suit cannot survive.” Dkt. 48 at 3. The Court has
21 | already rejected this argument because an IFCA claim may be based on an unreasonable
22 |

1 denial of payment of benefits. *See* Dkt. 33 at 4. Therefore, the Court denies American
2 Family’s motion on the Potters’ IFCA claim.

3 Second, American Family argues that “[a] reasonable valuation [of a claim] is a
4 complete defense to an IFCA claim.” Dkt. 41 at 10. American Family cites no authority
5 for this proposition, and, even if this was the law, the Court must view the facts in the
6 light most favorable to the Potters at this stage of the proceeding. Instead, American
7 Family cites a litany of authorities addressing claims for bad faith, which is a tort separate
8 from an IFCA claim. *See id.* The proper standard under IFCA is that “[d]isparity
9 between an offer and an arbitration award alone does not establish a violation of [IFCA].”
10 *Perez-Crisantos v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.*, 187 Wn.2d 669, 684 (2017) (citing *Am.*
11 *Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Osborn*, 104 Wash.App. 686, 701, 17 P.3d 1229 (2001)). “There
12 has to be something more.” *Id.*

13 Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the Potters, they have shown both
14 a disparity in American Family’s offer and the arbitration award and something more.
15 American Family’s internal documents show that some of their agents and/or employees
16 valued the claim at an amount almost twice what was offered. Moreover, Mr. Dietz
17 opines that American Family’s handling of the Potters’ claim fell below the industry
18 standards and that the low offer may have been improperly deflated based on internal
19 incentive programs. Therefore, the Court denies American Family’s motion on the
20 Potter’s IFCA claim because material questions of fact exist for trial.

