

20 defendants fraudulently named to destroy diversity, and that their alleged citizenship should be

21 disregarded for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. It also argues that "doe" defendants are not

23 Motor Co., 886 F.2d 1526, 1527 (9th Cir. 1989). See also Kruso v. International Telephone &

considered in determining diversity (even if they are not fraudulently joined). See Bryant v. Ford

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Telegraph Corp., 872 F.2d 1416, 1424, 1425 (9th Cir. 1989) (with this 1988 amendment, "the 1 2 naming of Doe defendants no longer defeats diversity jurisdiction"). [Dkt. # 10 at 3]

3 Cline argues that the two "Doe" defendants she named are not purely fictitious; she 4 named a specific manager (Karen Doe Manager) with whom she had contact on the day of the accident, and another specific employee-she knew the actual persons, but not their actual names, which is materially different than just naming a John Doe with no idea who that person 6 is. She also argues that her claims against these individuals are not fraudulent or sham, and that Safeway cannot adjudicate the plausibility of those claims in opposing remand. 8

9 The Court agrees that Safeway has not established that the Doe individuals were 10 fraudulently named to defeat diversity. Nevertheless, the Rule in the Circuit is that the citizenship of Doe defendants is not considered for evaluating diversity jurisdiction. Of course, if 11 12 these individuals are identified and named, and diversity is destroyed, we may re-visit this issue as well as the viability of such claims under Rule 12(b)(6). 13

The Motion to Remand is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated this 12th day of December, 2017.

Ronald B. Leighton United States District Judge