

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FIFTH DISTRICT

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

JONATHAN HERNANDEZ VELEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

Case No. 5D20-2274

GLORITAZ LAFONTAINE,

Respondent.

_____ /

Opinion filed December 4, 2020

Petition for Writ of Prohibition,
Diana M. Tennis, Respondent Judge.

Jonathan Hernandez Velez, Orlando, pro
se.

Clifford J. Geismar, of The Law Office of
Clifford J. Geismar, P.A., Winter Park, for
Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

The petition for a writ of prohibition to preclude the assigned trial judge from further presiding over the post-final judgment of paternity litigation below is denied on the merits. See *Krawczuk v. State*, 92 So. 3d 195, 201 (Fla. 2012) (recognizing that for a motion to disqualify a trial judge to be legally sufficient the “fear of judicial bias must be objectively reasonable”); *Wall v. State*, 238 So. 3d 127, 143 (Fla. 2018) (“[T]he context of the hearing and history of the case as reflected in the record are relevant to understanding whether

a movant has a well-founded fear of judicial bias.”); *Pilkington v. Pilkington*, 182 So. 3d 776, 779 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (“Adverse or unfavorable legal rulings, without more, are not legally sufficient grounds for disqualification.”); *Erlinger v. Federico*, 242 So. 3d 1177, 1182 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (finding that the movant’s allegation that the trial judge was biased on grounds that the judge became an active participant in the proceedings by asking the movant questions during cross-examination was both speculative and conclusory where the movant neither described the types of questions asked by the judge nor alleged how those questions demonstrated bias or prejudice).

PETITION DENIED.

LAMBERT, HARRIS, and SASSO, JJ., concur.