

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL  
FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

UNISOURCE ADMINISTRATORS  
and HERNANDO COUNTY  
SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT,

Appellants,

v.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO  
FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND  
DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D04-4704

JULIAN BRIDGES,

Appellee.

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Opinion filed October 18, 2005.

An appeal from an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims.  
Ellen Lorenzen, Judge.

Rex A. Hurley, Esquire and William H. Rogner, Esquire of Hurley, Rogner, Miller,  
Cox, Waranch & Westcott, P.A., Winter Park, for Appellants.

Paul A. Kelley, Esquire, Winter Park and William McCabe, Esquire of Shepherd,  
McCabe & Cooley, Longwood, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See § 112.18(1), Fla. Stat. (2002) (“Any condition . . . of any . . . law  
enforcement officer . . . caused by . . . heart disease . . . resulting in . . . disability . . .  
shall be presumed to have been . . . suffered in the line of duty unless the contrary be

shown by competent evidence[,] . . . [if the pre-employment physical] examination failed to reveal any evidence of any such condition.”); City of Mary Esther v. McArtor, 902 So. 2d 942, 943-44 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (rejecting contention that Sledge v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 497 So. 2d 1231 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), requires permanent disability or termination for the presumption to arise); City of Miami v. Thomas, 657 So. 2d 927, 928 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (“We . . . reject the City’s argument that . . . section 112.18[] was intended to be limited to permanent disability, so that the presumption would not apply to a temporary disability, as experienced by this claimant.”).

BENTON, PADOVANO, and BROWNING, JJ., CONCUR.