



although he admitted the violation, it was not willful or substantial. However, we conclude his second argument is meritorious—that the circuit court erred by failing to render a written order of revocation. We therefore remand this case for entry of a written order of revocation which specifies the conditions that the circuit court found Mr. Moschiano had violated. See Dawkins v. State, 936 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)<sup>1</sup>; Montonez v. State, 724 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999).

Affirmed; remanded with instructions.

CASANUEVA, DAVIS, and SILBERMAN, JJ., Concur.

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<sup>1</sup>We note that the procedure used in this case upon a finding of violation of probation—rendering a repeat judgment of conviction instead of an order of revocation—is the same procedure used in Hillsborough County that we disapproved in Dawkins, 936 So. 2d at 711-12. It would behoove the circuit court to amend its procedure in violation of probation and community control cases to avoid the pitfalls and potential problems outlined there.