NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DISPOSED OF. IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA THIRD DISTRICT JANUARY TERM, A.D. 2003 * * LAUDI DIAZ, ** CASE NO. 3D01-3000 Appellant, ** vs. ** LOWER TRIBUNAL CASE NO. 94-38682 THE STATE OF FLORIDA, ** * * Appellee.

Opinion filed May 21, 2003.

An appeal from the Circuit Court of Miami-Dade County, Roberto Pineiro, Judge.

John H. Lipinski, for appellant.

Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, and John D. Barker, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Before GREEN, FLETCHER, and SHEVIN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

We affirm the trial court's denial of Diaz' motion for postconviction relief. <u>See Smith v. State</u>, 697 So. 2d 991 (Fla 4th DCA 1997) (it is the trial court's responsibility to make findings of fact as to witness credibility). We do, however, reverse the trial court's finding that Diaz was guilty of criminal contempt. <u>See Rhoads v. State</u>, 817 So. 2d 1089 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (for a witness to be held in direct criminal contempt based on purported perjurious testimony there must be judicial knowledge of the falsity); <u>Newry v. State</u>, 654 So. 2d 1292 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) ('[T]he mere fact that the court believes one witness over another is insufficient to establish judicial knowledge [of false testimony]', citing from <u>Emanuel v. State</u>, 601 So. 2d 1273 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)); <u>Emanuel</u>, 601 So. 2d at 1275 ([Direct] contempt should be reserved for the most blatant cases in which perjury is virtually undisputed.).

Affirmed as to the denial of the post-conviction motion; reversed as to the trial court's finding that Diaz was guilty of contempt.

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