ELKA FREEMAN	*	NO. 2002-CA-1470
DIEFENTHAL, ANNA BETH		
GOODMAN WIFE OF/AND	*	COURT OF APPEAL
JOHN GOODMAN, PAUL J.		
LEAMAN, JR., MARGARET	*	FOURTH CIRCUIT
CAROLYN OTT WIFE OF/AND		
DR. PHILLIP R. LORIA, MAX	*	STATE OF LOUISIANA
NATHAN, JR., AND CAROLE		
CROWELL PETTIT WIFE	*	
OF/AND ROBERT L. PETTIT,		
JR.	*	
	* * * * * * *	

VERSUS

LONGUE VUE FOUNDATION AND LONGUE VUE HOUSE AND GARDENS CORPORATION

MCKAY, J. CONCURS IN THE RESULT

I concur with the majority's decision to affirm the judgment of the trial court. However, I am not in agreement with the majority's reasoning regarding building restrictions vis-à-vis servitudes.

First of all, I do not believe it was necessary that the majority address the issue of whether the 1931 agreement constitutes building restrictions or servitudes. The issue was not addressed in Judge Magee's judgment, nor did the Supreme Court address it in <u>Diefenthal v. Longue Vue Management</u>

Corp., 561 So.2d 44 (La. 1990).

That being said, in my opinion, the 1931 agreement creates a servitude

and not merely building restrictions. The 1931 agreement clearly states that "this agreement shall constitute a servitude upon each and every parcel of property hereinabove described in favor of each and every other piece or portion thereof and shall be a servitude running with the land, binding upon each and every present and future owner thereof." There are three basic requirements for servitudes. First, there must be two estates involved. Second, the estates must be owned by separate owners. Finally, there must be a charge on one estate for the benefit of the other. *See* La. C.C. art. 646. The covenants in the 1931 agreement meet all of the requirements for servitudes.