## STATEOF MICHIGAN

## COURT OF APPEALS

In the Matter of ASHLEY EVELHOCH and JACOB KEENAN, Minors.

## FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,

UNPUBLISHED
May 23, 2000
Petitioner-Appellee,
v

LISA BOSTIAN,
No. 222506
Muskegon Juvenile Court
LC No. 97-024584-NA

Respondent-Appellant.
and

PAUL EVELHOCH and JAMES KEENAN,

Respondents.

Before: Doctoroff, P.J., and Sawyer and Cavanagh, JJ.

MEMORANDUM.
Respondent mother appeals from an order of the probate court terminating her parental rights to the minor child pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(i), (a)(ii), (b)(i), (c)(i), (g) and (j); MSA $27.3178(598.19 b)(3)(a)(i),(a)(i i),(b)(i),(c)(i),(g)$ and (j). We affirm. ${ }^{1}$

In making a termination decision, the trial court must engage in a two-step analysis. First, it must determine if a statutory ground for termination has been established by clear and convincing evidence. Second, if a statutory ground has been established, the trial court must terminate parental rights unless it finds that termination is clearly not in the child's best interests. In re Hall-Smith, 222 Mich App 470, 472-473; 564 NW2d 156 (1997).

The Court has carefully reviewed the record on appeal, the opinion of the probate court, and petitioner's brief. We are not persuaded that the trial court erred in finding that the statutory grounds for termination were met and that it was in the best interests of the child to terminate the parental rights. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in terminating respondents' parental rights.

Affirmed.

/s/ Martin M. Doctoroff<br>/s/ David H. Sawyer<br>/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh

${ }^{1}$ Although the termination order does not differentiate between the various grounds alleged in the petition, it would appear that the allegations under § (a)(i) and (a)(ii) and (b) (i) only apply to one or both fathers.

