

STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS

In the Matter of STEVEN PARRIET and KAREN
PARRIET, Minors.

FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,

Petitioner-Appellee,

v

KIMBERLY BECKWITH, a/k/a KIMBERLY
PARRIET,

Respondent-Appellant.

UNPUBLISHED
September 1, 2000

No. 221353
Monroe Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 98-013563-NA

Before: Fitzgerald, P.J., and Holbrook, Jr. and McDonald, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent appeals as of right from a family court order terminating her parental rights to the minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (b)(ii), (c)(i), (g) and (j); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(b)(i), (ii), (c)(i), (g) and (j). We affirm.

On appeal, respondent argues that the trial court erred in finding that the statutory grounds for termination were established by clear and convincing evidence, but only challenges the court's findings with respect to §§ 19b(3)(b)(i), (ii) and (j) only. Because only one statutory ground is required in order to terminate parental rights, *In re McIntyre*, 192 Mich App 47, 50; 480 NW2d 293 (1991), and because respondent does not challenge the court's findings with respect to §§ 19b(3)(c)(i) and (g), respondent is not entitled to appellate relief with regard to the question whether a statutory ground for termination was established. See *In re JS & SM*, 231 Mich App 92, 98; 585 NW2d 326 (1998); *Roberts & Son Contracting, Inc v North Oakland Development Corp*, 163 Mich App 109, 113; 413 NW2d 744 (1987). In any event, we are satisfied that, at a minimum, the court did not clearly err in finding that §§ 19b(3)(b)(i) and (j) were both established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 5.974(I); *In re Miller*, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989).

Further, the evidence did not establish that termination of respondent's parental rights was clearly not in the children's best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(5); *In re Trejo*, ___ Mich ___; ___ NW2d ___ (Docket No. 112528, decided 7/5/2000), slip op at 14, 17. Thus, the trial court did not err in terminating respondent's parental rights to the children. *Id.*, slip op at 17.

Although respondent claims that the court was not authorized under § 19b(5) to delay making a final decision on the termination petition pending further counseling services, viewed as a whole, we find nothing in the language of § 19b that prohibited the court, within its discretion, from delaying its decision pending further testimony after additional family counseling was provided.

Finally, respondent has not established that her hearing impairment was not properly accommodated in the services that petitioner provided. *In re Terry*, 240 Mich App 14, 25-26; 610 NW2d 563 (2000). There is ample evidence that numerous services were provided to respondent and nothing in the record indicates that respondent was not able to take advantage of these services due to her hearing disability.

Affirmed.

/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Gary R. McDonald