STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

UNPUBLISHED March 16, 2001

Plaintiff-Appellee,

 \mathbf{v}

No. 220280 Wayne Circuit Court

LC No. 98-009729

ANTHONY WOLFE,

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: Murphy, P.J., and Hood and Cooper, JJ.

MEMORANDUM.

Defendant was convicted, following a jury trial, of two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC I), MCL 750.520b(1)(a); MSA 28.788(2)(1)(a) (sexual penetration with a person under thirteen), and two counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC II), MCL 750.520c(1)(a); MSA 28.788(3)(1)(a) (sexual contact with a person under thirteen). Defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of six to twenty years' imprisonment for the CSC I convictions and six to fifteen years' imprisonment for the CSC II convictions. He appeals as of right, and we affirm.

Defendant first argues that there was insufficient evidence of penetration to support the CSC I convictions. We disagree. When examining the sufficiency of the evidence, we examine the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a reasonable juror could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. *People v Nowack*, 462 Mich 392, 399-400; 614 NW2d 78 (2000). Our review is deferential because we must draw all reasonable inferences and assess credibility choices in accordance with the jury verdict. *Id.* at 400. Sexual penetration involves, any intrusion, however slight, involving any part of a person's body. MCL 750.520a(*l*); MSA 28.788(1)(*l*); See also *People v Hammons*, 210 Mich App 554, 557; 534 NW2d 183 (1995). Review of the record reveals that the victim testified that defendant placed his hand in her "private." On another occasion, the victim testified that defendant placed "his private" in her "private." Through questioning, the prosecutor was able to establish that the victim was referring to the male and female genitalia when using the term "private." The jury found that the victim was credible, and physical evidence of penetration is not required. Accordingly, defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is without merit.

Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in redacting a portion of the victim's statement to medical personnel that identified the date of an offense. We disagree. The trial

court did not abuse its discretion in redacting the date contained within the medical report when the statement at issue was not attributed to the victim or the victim's mother and the admission of such evidence was cumulative to testimony given by Dr. Savitri Karumanchi. *People v Brownridge*, 459 Mich 456, 461; 591 NW2d 26 (1999).

Affirmed.

/s/ William B. Murphy

/s/ Harold Hood

/s/ Jessica R. Cooper