

STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS

In the Matter of LORD NICHOLAS JACKSON,
and MARIAH JACKSON, Minors.

FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,

Petitioner-Appellee,

v

LORD E. JACKSON,

Respondent-Appellant,

and

JENNIFER WOOLIVER and JOHN HOOVER,

Respondents.

In the Matter of ALISHA WOOLIVER, LORD
NICHOLAS JACKSON, and MARIAH JACKSON,
Minors.

FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,

Petitioner-Appellee,

v

JENNIFER LYNN WOOLIVER,

Respondent-Appellant,

and

UNPUBLISHED
March 30, 2001

No. 222577
Macomb Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 96-042806-NA

No. 223254
Macomb Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 96-042806-NA

LORD JACKSON and JOHN HOOVER,

Respondents.

Before: Bandstra, C.J., and Griffin and Collins, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In these consolidated appeals, respondents-appellants Lord E. Jackson and Jennifer Lynn Wooliver appeal as of right from the order terminating their parental rights to the minor children. We affirm.

With respect to respondent Jackson, the circuit court did not clearly err in finding that the statutory ground for termination set forth at MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(a)(ii) was established by clear and convincing evidence.¹ MCR 5.974(F)(3) and (I); *In re Sours*, 459 Mich 624, 632; 593 NW2d 520 (1999). The record shows that Jackson had no contact with the minor children for more than ninety-one days and had not sought custody of the children during that time. Further, the evidence did not show that termination of respondent Jackson's parental rights was clearly not in the children's best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(5); *In re Trejo*, 462 Mich 341, 356-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). Thus, the circuit court did not err in terminating respondent Jackson's parental rights to the children.

With respect to respondent Wooliver, the circuit court did not clearly err in finding that MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(c)(i) was established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 5.974(I); *In re Sours*, *supra*. The conditions that led to adjudication included the lack of stable housing and income, substance abuse, improper supervision, and an inability to meet the children's needs. While the evidence shows that respondent, at times, made serious efforts at complying with her treatment plan during the 2 ½ year period the children were in foster care, the evidence also shows that her compliance was sporadic and that she fell significantly short in some respects. While respondent completed parenting classes, she failed to complete or follow through with the other programs to which she was referred, including substance abuse treatment, domestic violence counseling, and individual therapy. She also failed to submit to weekly drug screens as required by the parent-agency agreement, and moved to Tennessee, knowing that she would be unable to visit her children often. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding termination proper under § 19(b)(3)(c)(i).²

¹ Contrary to respondent Jackson's assertions, the record does not indicate that the court also relied on §§ 19b(3)(c)(i) and (g) as statutory grounds for termination of his parental rights. In any event, because only a single statutory ground is required in order to terminate parental rights, *In re Sours*, 459 Mich 624, 632; 593 NW2d 520 (1999), we need not address those subsections.

² Although the circuit court also cited § 19b(3)(g) as a ground for terminating respondent Wooliver's parental rights, she does not address the court's findings in that regard on appeal. Again, however, only a single statutory ground is required in order to terminate parental rights.

Further, we find no merit in respondent Wooliver's argument that petitioner did not make reasonable efforts to reunite respondent Wooliver with her children. MCR 5.973(A)(5)(c); MCL 712A.18f(1); MSA 27.398(598.18f)(1). As the court noted, petitioner provided referrals for drug treatment and domestic violence programs, parenting classes, drug and alcohol screens, and individual therapy. Again, the only program that she completed was the parenting class. It was not until respondent left Michigan that petitioner ceased making referrals.

Finally, the evidence did not show that termination of respondent Wooliver's parental rights was clearly not in the children's best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(5); *In re Trejo, supra*. Thus, the circuit court did not err in terminating respondent Wooliver's parental rights to the children.

Affirmed.

/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Jeffrey G. Collins