

STATE OF MICHIGAN  
COURT OF APPEALS

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In the Matter of TAUREAN EDWARD  
STRINGER, TRAVON ROBERT STRINGER,  
TRAVIS MARTELL STRINGER, and TRAMINE  
RODNEY STRINGER, Minors.

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FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,

Petitioner-Appellee,

V

ROBERT HUDSON,

Respondent-Appellant,

and

YOLANDA YVETTE STRINGER,

Respondent.

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UNPUBLISHED

March 1, 2002

No. 233516

Wayne Circuit Court

Family Division

LC No. 98-373756

Before: Jansen, P.J., and Zahra and Meter, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent-appellant appeals as of right from the trial court's order terminating his parental rights to the minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g) and (j). We affirm.

While we agree that the requirements of § 19b(3)(c)(i) were not established, only a single statutory ground need be supported to terminate parental rights. *In re McIntyre*, 192 Mich App 47, 50; 480 NW2d 293 (1991). Here, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that §§ 19b(3)(g) and (j) were established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 5.974(I); *In re Miller*, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989).<sup>1</sup> The evidence supported the finding that

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<sup>1</sup> Respondent-appellant inaccurately argues that petitioner was required to prove that he was either culpable in his neglect of the children, or that he intentionally neglected the children's needs, in order to terminate his parental rights. In light of changes to § 19b(3)(g), formerly § 19b(3)(d), it is no longer necessary to prove culpability in order to terminate parental rights

(continued...)

respondent-appellant did not complete the terms of his treatment plan. Despite some efforts to comply with the plan over a period of time, respondent-appellant never demonstrated that he had the skills to care for these children. The evidence suggested that respondent-appellant did not complete required parenting classes, domestic violence counseling, or a substance abuse evaluation. Respondent-appellant failed to submit regular drug screens. While respondent-appellant used his job as an excuse for failing to complete the terms of his treatment plan, the evidence suggests that the caseworker offered respondent-appellant reasonable means to complete the treatment within the confines of his work schedule. Given respondent-appellant's failure to take part in the necessary services, it was not clear error for the trial court to find that he would be unable to provide proper care or custody for the children within a reasonable time and that the children would be at risk of harm if returned to his care. §§ 19b(3)(g) and (j).

Further, the evidence did not show that termination of respondent-appellant's parental rights was clearly not in the children's best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); *In re Trejo*, 462 Mich 341, 354, 356-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). Given the children's special needs, particularly their need for constant supervision, respondent-appellant's employment and ability to provide financial support for the children does not establish that termination was not in the children's best interests. Moreover, the evidence supported the finding that respondent-appellant could not properly care for the children because he did not complete important aspects of his treatment plan. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the trial court did not err in terminating respondent-appellant's parental rights to the children.

Affirmed.

/s/ Kathleen Jansen  
/s/ Brian K. Zahra  
/s/ Patrick M. Meter

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(...continued)

under § 19b(3)(g). See *In re Jacobs*, 433 Mich 24, 36-37; 444 NW2d 789 (1989). Similarly, § 19b(3)(j), by its plain terms, does not require a showing of either culpability or intent.