

STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS

In the Matter of F.A.B.C., W.D.S.C., T.N.C.,
D.R.C., M.J.C., J.E.C., and K.S.H., Minors.

FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,

Petitioner-Appellee,

v

TAMMY CURRENCE,

Respondent-Appellant,

and

FRANKLIN CURRENCE,

Respondent.

UNPUBLISHED
November 22, 2002

No. 234582
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 99-383413

Before: Griffin, P.J., and Gage and Meter, JJ.

MEMORANDUM.

Respondent-appellant appeals as of right from the trial court order terminating her parental rights to the minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii), (c)(i), (g), and (j). We affirm. This case is being decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E)(1).

In the instant case, respondent was raising the children in a home with broken windows, with cats and dogs all around, and without heat, electricity, or running water. She had failed to send her children to school on a consistent basis. When they did attend school, they were dirty. Respondent allowed the children to run around outside at all times of the night unsupervised. In the two months prior to trial, respondent had held eleven jobs, had failed to maintain housing, had continued a relationship with a man who failed to complete a parent-agency agreement, had lied about her housing and employment, and had minimized the reasons that the children were taken from her care. Based on this evidence, the court could properly conclude that the conditions that led to the court's temporary custody of the children could not be rectified within a reasonable time considering the children's ages.

Although the trial court clearly erred in terminating respondent-appellant's parental rights to the children under § 19b(3)(a)(ii), this error was harmless where the statutory grounds for

termination were established by clear and convincing evidence under §§ 19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). MCR 5.974(I); *In re Miller*, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989); *In re Powers*, 244 Mich App 111, 117-118; 624 NW2d 472 (2000). Only one statutory ground is necessary to support termination. *Id.* Further, the evidence did not show that termination of respondent-appellant's parental rights was clearly not in the children's best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); *In re Trejo*, 462 Mich 341, 356-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). Thus, the trial court did not err in terminating respondent-appellant's parental rights to the children.

Affirmed.

/s/ Richard Allen Griffin

/s/ Hilda R. Gage

/s/ Patrick M. Meter