

STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS

In the Matter of LAWRENCE KYLE HUDSON,
LANGSTON KIPP HUDSON, CADEJA JACKA
SHAQUILLA DAVIS, and LAQUASHA JIMICA
JOHNESHA DAVIS, Minors.

FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,

Petitioner-Appellee,

v

TISWANNA MONIQUE HUDSON,

Respondent-Appellant.

UNPUBLISHED
November 18, 2003

No. 243343
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 99-382989

Before: Whitbeck, C.J., and Zahra and Donofrio, JJ.

MEMORANDUM.

Respondent Tiswana Hudson appeals as of right from the trial court's order terminating her parental rights to the minor children pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii), (g), and (j). We affirm.

I. Standard Of Review

To terminate parental rights, the trial court must find that at least one statutory ground for termination in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been met by clear and convincing evidence.¹ We review the trial court's findings of fact and decision for clear error.² To find clear error, "a decision must strike [the Court] as more than just maybe or probably wrong."³

¹ *In re Trejo*, 462 Mich 341, 350; 612 NW2d 407 (2000).

² MCR 5.974(I); *In re Sours*, 459 Mich 624, 633; 593 NW2d 520 (1999); *Trejo*, *supra* at 356-357.

³ *Sours*, *supra* at 633.

II. Clear And Convincing Evidence

We conclude that the trial court did not clearly err in finding that §§ 19b(3)(c)(ii), (g) and (j) were each established by clear and convincing evidence.⁴ The evidence clearly and convincingly showed that the children were sexually abused and that Hudson failed to recognize or take action to understand or remedy the abuse. After nearly two years in foster care, Hudson still had not complied with all of the requirements of her parent-agency agreement, had not regularly visited the children or taken part in their therapy or medical appointments, and continued to lack insight into the children's needs.

III. The Best Interests Of The Children

We further conclude that the evidence did not show that termination of Hudson's parental rights was clearly not in the children's best interests.⁵ The youngest twin children had been in foster care for most of their lives and were not bonded to Hudson. The older children no longer asked about Hudson, and, as the trial court noted, all of the children needed permanency in their lives. We conclude that the trial court did not err in terminating Hudson's parental rights to the children.

Affirmed.

/s/ William C. Whitbeck

/s/ Brian K. Zahra

/s/ Pat M. Donofrio

⁴ MCR 5.974(I) (The court rules governing child protective proceedings were amended and recodified as part of new MCR subchapter 3.900, effective May 1, 2003. This opinion refers to the rules in effect at the time of the trial court's decision); *Trejo, supra* at 351; *Sours, supra* at 633.

⁵ MCL 712A.19b(5); *Trejo, supra*.