

STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS

In the Matter of SUMMER MICHELLE
CAMPBELL and JAMES COREY IRONS,
Minors.

DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,

Petitioner-Appellee,

v

BEVERLY DAWN CAMPBELL,

Respondent-Appellant.

UNPUBLISHED
December 21, 2006

No. 270610
Oakland Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 05-706227-NA

Before: Murphy, P.J., and Smolenski and Kelly, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent appeals as of right from the orders terminating her parental rights to the minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (g), and (j). We affirm. This appeal is being decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).

The trial court did not clearly err in finding that the statutory grounds for termination were established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 3.977(J); *In re Trejo*, 462 Mich 341, 353-354; 612 NW2d 407 (2000); *In re Sours*, 459 Mich 624, 633; 593 NW2d 520 (1999). Respondent was the mother of two special needs children. Testimony revealed that respondent failed to provide proper care for these children. School personnel expressed concern for the children's hygiene. Denise Sokol, the school social worker, also expressed concern with how the son was being medicated and for his safety. According to Sokol, the school received a telephone call from respondent, where she stated that she had hit her son. Cheryl Cnossen, a therapist with Easter Seals, opined that respondent was overwhelmed by the care of her two children. Cnossen further stated that, given respondent's mental health issues, she was not able to provide a consistent, stable, and nurturing environment for them.

Assuming the above evidence fails to support a finding that respondent caused physical injury to her son, the facts did establish that respondent's failure to acknowledge and address her mental illness and the trial court did not clearly err in finding that respondent would not be able to provide proper care within a reasonable time considering the children's ages or that there was a reasonable likelihood that the children would be harmed if returned to respondent's care. Thus,

termination was warranted under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (g), and (j). Only one ground is necessary to support termination. MCL 712A.19(b)(3).

Respondent next contends that termination of her parental rights was contrary to the children's best interests. Testimony revealed that respondent loved her children. However, these children needed more than respondent's love. As noted by Cnossen, these children needed a high level of care and supervision. Respondent's psychological evaluation, admitted into evidence at the best interests hearing, supports the finding that respondent was not capable of providing the necessary care for her children. Thus, the evidence did not demonstrate that termination of respondent's parental rights was clearly not in the children's best interests.

Respondent also contends that she should have been provided more services. However, respondent acknowledged in her testimony that she had been offered numerous services but claimed that she could parent better without assistance. Throughout the proceedings, respondent declined the continued assistance of various service providers and refused to address her own mental illness. Therefore, respondent's argument lacks merit.

Affirmed.

/s/ William B. Murphy

/s/ Michael R. Smolenski