STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

In the Matter of CONNER E. BECKETT, Minor.

DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,

Petitioner-Appellee,

 \mathbf{v}

PETER JOSEPH BECKETT,

Respondent-Appellant,

and

CHARLENE LEONE MEADE.

Respondent.

Before: White, P.J., and Hoekstra and Smolenski, JJ.

MEMORANDUM.

Respondent Peter Joseph Beckett appeals as of right from the trial court's order terminating his parental rights to his minor child pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). We affirm. This appeal is being decided without oral argument under MCR 7.214(E).

The trial court did not clearly err in finding that clear and convincing evidence established the statutory grounds for termination of respondent's parental rights. MCR 3.977(G), (J); *In re Trejo*, 462 Mich 341, 356-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000).

The conditions that caused the child to come into care included neglect, substance abuse, and domestic violence. Respondent did not substantially comply with the services offered. He did not consistently and honestly submit drug screens, he failed to participate fully in a counseling program, and he did not complete parenting classes. Because respondent did not participate in the services offered, or alternatively benefit from the services he did participate in, the trial court did not err when it concluded that respondent had yet to adequately address his substance abuse and anger management issues. Further, at the time of termination, respondent did not have suitable housing and had not provided verification of stable employment. Indeed, at the time of the hearing, respondent was jailed awaiting sentencing. This was a recurring theme as respondent had been in and out of jail during the entire case. At the time of termination,

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No. 282445 Oakland Circuit Court Family Division LC No. 06-722813-NA Conner had been in care for nearly 18 months yet the foster care worker described respondent as still being at "square one." Because respondent lacked the capacity to provide a safe, caring, and nurturing environment for his child, and would not be able to do so within a reasonable time, the trial court did not err when it terminated respondent's parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j).

Additionally, there was no evidence that, despite statutory grounds for termination, termination of parental rights would not be in Conner's best interests. Any bond that existed between respondent and his son was tenuous. Moreover, the evidence clearly demonstrated that the child would be at risk of injury if returned to respondent's care. Respondent was simply in no better position to parent his child than when Conner came into care. Conner was only two years old. He deserved to have the benefit of a safe, stable, and nurturing environment to facilitate his continued growth and development.

Affirmed.

/s/ Helene N. White

/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra

/s/ Michael R. Smolenski