

STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS

UNPUBLISHED
November 15, 2011

In the Matter of YOUNG, Minors.

No. 304406
Berrien Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 2011-000016-NA

Before: JANSEN, P.J., and SAWYER and SHAPIRO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM.

Respondent appeals as of right the order terminating her parental rights to her minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), (i), (j), and (l). We affirm.

The trial court did not clearly err in finding that petitioner established at least one statutory ground for termination of parental rights by clear and convincing evidence. *In re JK*, 468 Mich 202, 210; 661 NW2d 216 (2003). The court also did not clearly err in finding that termination of respondent's parental rights was in the children's best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5).

Respondent does not dispute that her rights to other children were terminated under this state's child protection laws. Nothing else is required under the express language of MCL 712A.19b(3)(l). After a trial court finds a prior termination, it should analyze whether the respondent or the circumstances have sufficiently changed so that termination is not in these children's best interests. See MCL 712A.19b(5); *In re Trejo*, 462 Mich 341, 352-353; 612 NW2d 407 (2000); *In re AH*, 245 Mich App 77, 85; 627 NW2d 33 (2001). Reasonable efforts to reunite the family are not required when the parent's rights to other children were involuntarily terminated. MCL 712A.19a(2)(c). Regardless, petitioner in the present case offered services. Respondent missed four psychological evaluation appointments and was dropped from parenting classes after missing the first three.

Because one statutory ground was clearly established, this Court should not reverse even if there was insufficient evidence of another statutory ground. See *In re Huisman*, 230 Mich App 372, 384-385; 584 NW2d 349 (1998). However, respondent's erratic behavior and failure to participate in services constituted sufficient evidence that there was no reasonable expectation she would provide proper care and custody in a reasonable time, MCL 712A.91b(3)(g), and the children were likely to be harmed if placed in her care, MCL 712A.19b(j).

The trial court also did not err when it found that termination was in the children's best interests. Respondent's long protective services history and her conduct during the present proceedings showed clearly that she could not provide a safe home in the foreseeable future. It was not in the children's best interests to grant her additional time when she already failed to take advantage of the services offered after their birth. Permanency was in their best interests. See *In re McIntyre*, 192 Mich App 47, 52; 480 NW2d 293 (1991).

Affirmed.

/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro