

STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS

UNPUBLISHED
February 16, 2012

In the Matter of Y. TAYLOR, Minor.

No. 305789
Kent Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 09-052733-NA

In the Matter of K. TAYLOR, Minor.

No. 305940
Kent Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 11-051608-NA

Before: SAWYER, P.J., and O'CONNELL and RONAYNE KRAUSE, JJ.

MEMORANDUM.

In these consolidated cases, respondent T. Taylor appeals as of right from the trial court's orders terminating her parental rights to Y. Taylor pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), (i), and (l), and terminating her parental rights to K. Taylor pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), (i), and (l). We affirm.

To the extent that respondent is challenging the trial court's determinations concerning the existence of a statutory ground for termination, no clear error is apparent. *In re Trejo*, 462 Mich 341, 356-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000); MCR 3.977(K). It is undisputed that respondent's parental rights to two other children were involuntarily terminated in 2009 after the initiation of child protective proceedings under MCL 712A.2(b). Thus, at a minimum, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that § 19b(3)(l) was proven by clear and convincing evidence in each case.

Because only one statutory ground for termination need be proven, *In re CR*, 250 Mich App 185, 207; 646 NW2d 506 (2002), it is unnecessary to address the remaining statutory grounds, none of which are directly addressed by respondent.

To the extent that respondent argues that termination of her parental rights to K. Taylor was improper because she was not provided with reunification services, her argument is without merit. While petitioner is required to make reasonable efforts to reunify a child with his or her family in most cases, reunification efforts were not required here because respondent's parental

rights to the child's siblings were previously involuntarily terminated. MCL 712A.19a(2)(c). See also *In re Smith*, 291 Mich App 621; 805 NW2d 234 (2011).

Respondent's arguments appear to be principally directed at the children's best interests. However, considering respondent's inability to overcome her substance abuse problem as demonstrated by the fact that both children tested positive for cocaine at birth and that respondent continued to test positive for cocaine throughout these cases, and respondent's refusal to acknowledge either having a substance abuse problem or that her continued illegal substance abuse had any effect on her parenting abilities, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that termination of respondent's parental rights was in the children's best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); *In re Trejo*, 462 Mich 356-357.

Affirmed.

/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Peter D. O'Connell
/s/ Amy Ronayne Krause