## Bethpage Fed. Credit Union v Terry

2014 NY Slip Op 32856(U)

October 21, 2014

Supreme Court, Suffolk County

Docket Number: 12911-12

Judge: Elizabeth H. Emerson

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SHORT FORM ORDER



INDEX NO.: 12911-12

## SUPREME COURT - STATE OF NEW YORK IAS PART 8 - SUFFOLK COUNTY

Justice of the Supreme Court	MOTION DATE, 8-29-13
	ADJ. DATE 6/5/14
BETHPAGE FEDERAL CREDIT UNION,	Mot. Seq. #001-MotD
Plaintiff,	BERKMAN HENOCH PETERSON & PEDDY
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	Attorneys for Plaintiff
	100 Garden City Plaza
-against-	Garden City, N. Y.
DAVID B. TERRY, CONSTANCE G. TERRY,	MICHAEL KINZER, ESQ.
COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION & FINANCE	Attorney for Defendant
CIVIL ENFORCEMENT CO-ATC, PORTFOLIO	David B. Terry
RECOVERY ASSOCIATES, LLC CAPITAL ONE BANK USA, N.A., COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION	100 Broadhollow Rd. Suite 205
AND FINANCE CIVIL ENFORCEMENT	Farmingdale, N. Y. 11735
COLLECTION-VENDOR SUPPORT UNIT,	
"JOHN DOE #1" through "JOHN DOE #12", the	
last twelve names being fictitious and unknown to	
plaintiff, the persons or parties intended being the	
tenants, occupants, persons or corporations, if any,	
having or claiming an interest in or lien upon the	
premises, described in the complaint,	
Defendants.	
x	
Upon the following papers numbered 1 to9 rea	ad on this motion for summary judgment. Notice of
Motion/Order to Show Cause and supporting papers 1 - 9; No	tice of Cross Motion and supporting papers
Answering Affidavits and supporting papers; Replying Affida	avits and supporting papers : Other

ORDERED that this unopposed motion by the plaintiff for, inter alia, an order: (1) pursuant to CPLR 3212 awarding summary judgment in its favor and against the defendant David Terry, striking his answer and dismissing the affirmative defenses set forth therein; (2) pursuant to CPLR 3215 fixing the defaults of the non-answering defendants; (3) pursuant to RPAPL § 1321 appointing a referee to (a) compute amounts due under the subject mortgage; and (b) examine and report whether the subject premises should be sold in one parcel or multiple parcels; and (4) amending the caption is determined as set forth below; and it is

[\* 2]

Bethpage Federal Credit Union v Terry, et. al.

Index No.: 12911-12

Pg. 2

**ORDERED** that the branch of the motion wherein the plaintiff requests an order awarding it the costs of this motion is denied without prejudice, leave to renew upon proper documentation for costs at the time of submission of the judgment; and it is

**ORDERED** that the plaintiff is directed to serve a copy of this order amending the caption upon the Calendar Clerk of this Court; and it is further

ORDERED that the plaintiff is directed to serve a copy of this Order with notice of entry upon all parties who have appeared herein and not waived further notice pursuant to CPLR 2103(b)(1), (2) or (3) within thirty (30) days of the date herein, and to promptly file the affidavits of service with the Clerk of the Court.

This is an action to foreclose a mortgage on real property known as 29 West End Avenue, Quogue, New York 11942. On January 17, 2003, the defendant David Terry executed a fixed/adjustable-rate note (the 2003 note) in favor of Bethpage Federal Credit Union (the plaintiff) in the principal sum of \$650,000.00. To secure said note, the defendants David Terry and Constance Terry (the defendant mortgagors) gave the plaintiff a mortgage also dated January 17, 2003 (the 2003 mortgage) on the property. On October 20, 2006, the defendant mortgagors executed a credit line account variable interest rate home equity secured open-end credit agreement (the HELOC) in favor of the plaintiff wherein and whereby they jointly promised to repay the plaintiff the sums borrowed pursuant to said credit line, up to a maximum credit limit of \$100,000.00. The secure the payment of the sum represented by the HELOC, the defendant mortgagors gave the plaintiff a mortgage also dated October 20, 2006 (the 2006 mortgage). The 2003 mortgage and the 2006 mortgage, through incorporation by reference, provided, among other things, that the total indebtedness shall become due at the option of the holder of the mortgages after failure to keep any promise or agreement in said mortgages, including the promises to pay the amounts owned to the lender pursuant to the note, the HELOC and the aforesaid mortgages.

The defendant mortgagors allegedly defaulted on the 2003 note and mortgage by failing to make the monthly payment of principal and interest due on or about May 1, 2011, and each month thereafter. Subsequently, the defendant mortgagors allegedly defaulted on the HELOC and the 2006 mortgage by failing to make the monthly payment of principal and interest due on or about April through June, 2011, and each month thereafter. After the defendant mortgagors allegedly failed to cure their default, the plaintiff commenced the instant action by the filing of a lis pendens, summons and verified complaint on April 25, 2012. The complaint contains two causes of action, the first for a foreclosure and sale of the 2003 note and mortgage, and the second for a foreclosure and sale of the HELOC and the 2006 mortgage.

Issue was joined by the interposition of Mr. Terry's answer sworn to on May 11, 2012. By his answer, Mr. Terry generally denies all of the allegations set forth in the complaint, and asserts eleven affirmative defenses, alleging, among other things: the lack of personal jurisdiction over him; the lack

[\* 3]

Bethpage Federal Credit Union v Terry, et. al. Index No.: 12911-12

Pg. 3

of standing (alleged as a second and a third affirmative defense); the doctrine of unclean hands in connection with violations of Banking Law §§ 6-l and 6-m; and the failure to: comply with the requirements of RPAPL §§ 1303, 1304 and 1306; comply with the applicable Federal Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) guidelines (see,12 USC § 5219a); demonstrate that it is entitled to legal fees and costs of this action; comply with the requirements of the Truth In Lending Act (TILA) (15 USC § 1601, et seq.) as well as Federal Reserve Board Regulation Z (Regulation Z) (12 CFR part 226); act in good faith by not providing a loan modification; and properly credit payments. The remaining defendants have neither answered the complaint, nor appeared herein.

According to the records maintained by the court's computerized database, settlement conferences were conducted or adjourned before the specialized mortgage foreclosure part beginning on March 18, 2013 and continuing through to June 3, 2013. At the last conference, this action was marked to indicate that the parties could not reach an agreement to modify the loan or otherwise settle this action. The court also notes that a representative of the plaintiff attended and participated in all settlement conferences. Accordingly, the conference requirements imposed by CPLR 3408 have been satisfied; no further conference is required.

The plaintiff now moves for, inter alia, an order: (1) pursuant to CPLR 3212 awarding summary judgment in its favor and against Mr. Terry, striking his answer and dismissing the affirmative defenses therein; (2) pursuant to CPLR 3215 fixing the defaults of the non-answering defendants; (3) pursuant to RPAPL § 1321 appointing a referee to (a) compute amounts due under the subject mortgage; and (b) examine and report whether the subject premises should be sold in one parcel or multiple parcels; and (4) amending the caption. No opposition has been filed in response to this motion.

A plaintiff in a mortgage foreclosure action establishes a prima facie case for summary judgment by submission of the mortgage, the note, bond or obligation, and evidence of default (see, Valley Natl. Bank v Deutsch, 88 AD3d 691, 930 NYS2d 477 [2d Dept 2011]; Wells Fargo Bank v Das Karla, 71 AD3d 1006, 896 NYS2d 681 [2d Dept 2010]; Washington Mut. Bank, F.A. v O'Connor, 63 AD3d 832, 880 NYS2d 696 [2d Dept 2009]). The burden then shifts to the defendant to demonstrate "the existence of a triable issue of fact as to a bona fide defense to the action, such as waiver, estoppel, bad faith, fraud, or oppressive or unconscionable conduct on the part of the plaintiff" (Capstone Bus. Credit, LLC v Imperia Family Realty, LLC, 70 AD3d 882, 883, 895 NYS2d 199 [2d Dept 2010], quoting Mahopac Natl. Bank v Baisley, 244 AD2d 466, 467, 644 NYS2d 345 [2d Dept 1997]).

By its submissions, the plaintiff established its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment on the complaint (see, CPLR 3212; RPAPL § 1321; Wachovia Bank, N.A. v Carcano, 106 AD3d 724, 965 NYS2d 516 [2d Dept 2013]; U.S. Bank, N.A. v Denaro, 98 AD3d 964, 950 NYS2d 581 [2d Dept 2012]; Capital One, N.A. v Knollwood Props. II, LLC, 98 AD3d 707, 950 NYS2d 482 [2d Dept 2012]). In the instant case, the plaintiff produced, inter alia, the 2003 note, the 2003 mortgage, the HELOC, the 2006 mortgage and evidence of nonpayment (see, Federal Home Loan Mtge. Corp. v

Bethpage Federal Credit Union v Terry, et. al. Index No.: 12911-12 Pg. 4

Karastathis, 237 AD2d 558, 655 NYS2d 631 [2d Dept 1997]; First Trust Natl. Assn. v Meisels, 234 AD2d 414, 651 NYS2d 121 [2d Dept 1996]). Furthermore, the plaintiff submitted proof of compliance with the notice requirements of RPAPL §§ 1303 and 1304 as well as RPAPL 1306 (see, Castle Peak 2012-I Trust v Choudhury, 2013 NY Misc LEXIS 5510, 2013 WL 6229919, 2013 NY Slip Op 32971 [U] [Sup Ct, Queens County 2013]; M & T Bank v Romero, 40 Misc3d 1210 [A], 977 NYS2d 667 [Sup Ct, Suffolk County 2013]; cf., Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v Weisblum, 85 AD3d 95, 923 NYS2d 609 [2d Dept 2011]). Moreover, the plaintiff submitted an affidavit from its representative wherein it is alleged that the plaintiff was the holder of the note and mortgage at the time of commencement as the originating lender, and that it has maintained possession of the same since that time (see, Kondaur Capital Corp. v McCary, 115 AD3d 649, 981 NYS2d 547 [2d Dept 2014]; Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Whalen, 107 AD3d 931, 969 NYS2d 82 [2d Dept 2013]; HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Avila, 2013 NY Misc LEXIS 4521, 2013 WL 5606741, 2013 NY Slip Op 32412 [U] [Sup Ct, Suffolk County 2013]). Thus, the plaintiff demonstrated its prima facie burden as to the merits of this foreclosure action and as to its standing.

The plaintiff also submitted sufficient proof to establish, prima facie, that the affirmative defenses set forth in Mr. Terry's answer are subject to dismissal due to their unmeritorious nature (see, Becher v Feller, 64 AD3d 672, 884 NYS2d 83 [2d Dept 2009]; Wells Fargo Bank Minn., N.A. v Perez, 41 AD3d 590, 837 NYS2d 877 [2d Dept 2007]; Coppa v Fabozzi, 5 AD3d 718, 773 NYS2d 604 [2d Dept 2004] [unsupported affirmative defenses are lacking in merit]; see also, Bank of America, N.A. v Lucido, 114 AD3d 714, 981 NYS2d 433 [2d Dept 2014] [plaintiff's refusal to consider a reduction in principal does not establish a failure to negotiate in good faith]; Washington Mut. Bank v Schenk, 112 AD3d 615, 975 NYS2d 902 [2d Dept 2013]; JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Ilardo, 36 Misc3d 359, 940 NYS2d 829 [Sup Ct, Suffolk County 2012] [plaintiff not obligated to accept a tender of less than full repayment as demanded]; Bank of N.Y. Mellon v Scura, 102 AD3d 714, 961 NYS2d 185 [2d Dept 2013]; Scarano v Scarano, 63 AD3d 716, 880 NYS2d 682 [2d Dept 2009] [process server's sworn affidavit of service is prima facie evidence of proper service]; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Van Dyke, 101 AD3d 638, 958 NYS2d 331 [1st Dept 2012]; Long Is. Sav. Bank of Centereach, F.S.B. v Denkensohn, 222 AD2d 659, 635 NYS2d 683 [2d Dept 1995] [dispute as to amount owed by the mortgagor is not a defense to a foreclosure action]; Grogg v South Rd. Assoc., L.P., 74 AD3d 1021, 907 NYS2d 22 [2d Dept 2010] [the mere denial of receipt of the notice of default is insufficient to rebut the presumption of delivery]; Charter One Bank, FSB v Leone, 45 AD3d 958, 845 NYS2d 513 [3d Dept 2007] [no competent evidence of an accord and satisfaction]; Connecticut Natl. Bank v Peach Lake Plaza, 204 AD2d 909, 612 NYS2d 494 [3d Dept 1994] [defense based upon the doctrine of unclean hands lacks merit where a defendant fails to come forward with admissible evidence of showing immoral or unconscionable behavior]; HSBC Bank USA v Picarelli, 36 Misc3d 1218 [A], 959 NYS2d 89 [Sup Ct, Queens County 2012] [TILA requirements satisfied where the lender provided the required information and forms to the obligor at the closing]). Furthermore, "when a mortgagor defaults on loan payments, even if only for a day, a mortgagee may accelerate the loan, require that the balance be tendered or commence foreclosure proceedings, and equity will not intervene" (Home Sav. Of Am., FSB v Isaacson, 240 AD2d 633, 633, 659 NYS2d 94 [2d Dept 1997]).

Bethpage Federal Credit Union

v Terry, et. al. Index No.: 12911-12

Pg. 5

As the plaintiff duly demonstrated its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the burden of proof shifted to Mr. Terry (see, HSBC Bank USA v Merrill, 37 AD3d 899, 830 NYS2d 598 [3d Dept 2007]). Accordingly, it was incumbent upon Mr. Terry to produce evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of fact as to a bona fide defense to the action (see, Baron Assoc., LLC v Garcia Group Enters., Inc., 96 AD3d 793, 946 NYS2d 611 [2d Dept 2012]; Washington Mut. Bank v Valencia, 92 AD3d 774, 939 NYS2d 73 [2d Dept 2012]).

Self-serving and conclusory allegations do not raise issues of fact, and do not require the plaintiff to respond to alleged affirmative defenses which are based on such allegations (see, Charter One Bank, FSB v Leone, 45 AD3d 958, 845 NYS2d 513 [2d Dept 2007]; Rosen Auto Leasing, Inc. v Jacobs, 9 AD3d 798, 780 NYS2d 438 [3d Dept 2004]). In instances where a defendant fails to oppose a motion for summary judgment, the facts, as alleged in the moving papers, may be deemed admitted and there is, in effect, a concession that no question of fact exists (see, Kuehne & Nagel, Inc. v Baiden, 36 NY2d 539, 369 NYS2d 667 [1975]; see also, Madeline D'Anthony Enters., Inc. v Sokolowsky, 101 AD3d 606, 957 NYS2d 88 [1st Dept 2012]; Argent Mtge. Co., LLC v Mentesana, 79 AD3d 1079, 915 NYS2d 591 [2d Dept 2010]). Additionally, "uncontradicted facts are deemed admitted" (Tortorello v Carlin, 260 AD2d 201, 206, 688 NYS2d 64 [1st Dept 1999] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).

Mr. Terry's answer is insufficient, as a matter of law, to defeat the plaintiff's unopposed motion (see, Flagstar Bank v Bellafiore, 94 AD3d 1044, 943 NYS2d 551 [2d Dept 2012]; Argent Mtge. Co., LLC v Mentesana, 79 AD3d 1079, supra). In this case, the affirmative defenses asserted by Mr. Terry are factually unsupported and without apparent merit (see, Becher v Feller, 64 AD3d 672, supra). In any event, the failure by Mr. Terry to raise and/or assert his pleaded defenses in opposition to the plaintiff's motion warrants the dismissal of the same as abandoned under the case authorities cited above (see, Kuehne & Nagel v Baiden, 36 NY2d 539, supra; see also, Madeline D'Anthony Enters., Inc. v Sokolowsky, 101 AD3d 606, supra).

Under these circumstances, the Court finds that Mr. Terry failed to rebut the plaintiff's prima facie showing of its entitlement to summary judgment requested by it (see, Flagstar Bank v Bellafiore, 94 AD3d 1044, supra; Argent Mtge. Co., LLC v Mentesana, 79 AD3d 1079, supra; Rossrock Fund II, L.P. v Commack Inv. Group, Inc., 78 AD3d 920, 912 NYS2d 71 [2d Dept 2010]; see generally, Hermitage Ins. Co. v Trance Nite Club, Inc., 40 AD3d 1032, 834 NYS2d 870 [2d Dept 2007]). The plaintiff, therefore, is awarded summary judgment in its favor against Mr. Terry (see, Federal Home Loan Mtge. Corp. v Karastathis, 237 AD2d 558, supra; see generally, Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 427 NYS2d 595 [1980]). Accordingly, Mr. Terry's answer is stricken, and affirmative defenses set forth therein are dismissed.

The branch of the instant motion wherein the plaintiff seeks an order pursuant to CPLR 1024 amending the caption by excising the names of the fictitious defendants, John Doe #1-12, is also granted (see, PHH Mtge. Corp. v Davis, 111 AD3d 1110, 975 NYS2d 480 [3d Dept 2013]; Flagstar Bank v Bellafiore, 94 AD3d 1044, supra; Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of N.Y. City, Inc. v Meltzer,

Bethpage Federal Credit Union

v Terry, et. al.

Index No.: 12911-12

Pg. 6

67 AD3d 872, 889 NYS2d 627 [2d Dept 2009]). By its submissions, the plaintiff established the basis for the above-noted relief. All future proceedings shall be captioned accordingly.

By its moving papers, the plaintiff further established the default in answering on the part of the defendants Constance Terry, Commissioner of Taxation and Finance Civil Enforcement CO-ATC, Capital One Bank, USA, N.A., Commissioner of Taxation and Finance Civil Enforcement and Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC (see, RPAPL § 1321; HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Roldan, 80 AD3d 566, 914 NYS2d 647 [2d Dept 2011]). Accordingly, the defaults of the above-noted defendants are fixed and determined. Since the plaintiff has been awarded summary judgment against Mr. Terry, and has established the default in answering by all of the non-answering defendants, the plaintiff is entitled to an order appointing a referee to compute amounts due under the subject note and mortgage (see, RPAPL § 1321; Ocwen Fed. Bank FSB v Miller, 18 AD3d 527, 794 NYS2d 650 [2d Dept 2005]; Vermont Fed. Bank v Chase, 226 AD2d 1034, 641 NYS2d 440 [3d Dept 1996]; Bank of E. Asia v Smith, 201 AD2d 522, 607 NYS2d 431 [2d Dept 1994]).

Accordingly, this motion for, inter alia, summary judgment and an order of reference is determined as set forth above. The proposed long form order appointing a referee to compute pursuant to RPAPL § 1321, as modified by the Court, has been signed concurrently herewith.

Dated: October 21, 3014

Hon. ELIZABETH H. EMERSONJ.S.C.

\_ FINAL DISPOSITION \_\_X\_ NON-FINAL DISPOSITION