

which the possessor has or should have knowledge. *Durst v. VanGundy* (1982), 8 Ohio App. 37 72; *Wells v. University Hospital* (1985), 85-01392-AD. As a result of plaintiff's status, defendant was also under a duty to exercise ordinary care in providing for plaintiff's safety and warning him of any condition on the premises known by defendant to be potentially dangerous. *Crabtree v. Shultz* (1977), 57 Ohio App. 2d 33.

{¶ 4} Although the owner owes this duty of ordinary care, "the liability of an owner or occupant to an invitee for negligence in failing to render the premises reasonably safe for the invitee, or in failing to warn him of dangers thereon, must be predicated upon a superior knowledge concerning the dangers of the premises to persons going thereon." 38 American Jurisprudence, 757, Negligence, Section 97, as cited in *Debie v. Cochran Pharmacy Berwick, Inc.* (1967), 11 Ohio St. 2d 38, 40. In the instant case, it is not obvious or apparent plaintiff had any knowledge of the protruding rebar. Considering a driver's position in an automobile, and the position of the parking block on the ground, it is probable the rebar was never seen as plaintiff entered and exited the parking space. Therefore, the court finds defendant had superior knowledge of the hazardous condition and failed to warn plaintiff of the condition or remove it. See *21st Century Leasing, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Natural Resources* (1999), 98-08994-AD.

{¶ 5} Defendant was charged with a duty to exercise reasonable care for the protection of plaintiff's property. In regard to the facts of this claim, negligence on the part of defendant has been shown. *Jackson v. University of Akron* (2001), 2001-04026-AD. Consequently, defendant is liable to plaintiff for the loss claimed, \$150.00, plus the \$25.00 filing fee, which may be reimbursed as compensable damages pursuant to the holding in *Bailey v. Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction* (1990), 62 Ohio Misc. 2d 19.

