

[Cite as *State v. Hall*, 2010-Ohio-3497.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 90366

STATE OF OHIO

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE

vs.

JOAN M. HALL

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

**JUDGMENT:
APPLICATION DENIED**

Application for Reopening
Motion No. 435293
Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court
Case No. CR-475449

RELEASE DATE: July 28, 2010

FOR APPELLANT

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ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

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FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J.:

{¶ 1} Joan M. Hall has filed an application for reopening pursuant to App.R. 26(B). Hall is attempting to reopen the appellate judgment, as rendered in *State v. Hall*, Cuyahoga App. No. 90366, 2009-Ohio-462, which affirmed her conviction for the offenses of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity (R.C. 2923.32), tampering with records (R.C. 2913.43), possessing criminal tools (R.C. 2923.24), theft (R.C. 2913.02), tampering with records (R.C. 2913.42), illegal use of food stamps (R.C. 2913.46(C)(1)), forgery (R.C. 2913.31), and money

laundrying (R.C. 1315.55), but reversed and remanded as to the calculation of fines. We decline to reopen Hall's appeal.

{¶ 2} App.R. 26(B)(2)(b) requires that Hall establish "a showing of good cause for untimely filing if the application is filed more than 90 days after journalization of the appellate judgment," which is subject to reopening. The Supreme Court of Ohio, with regard to the 90-day deadline as provided by App.R. 26(B)(2)(b), has firmly established that:

{¶ 3} "We now reject [applicant's] claim that those excuses gave him good cause to miss the 90-day deadline in App.R. 26(B). The rule was amended to include the 90-day deadline more than seven months before [applicant's] appeal of right was decided by the court of appeals in February 1994, so the rule was firmly established then, just as it is today. **Consistent enforcement of the rule's deadline by the appellate courts in Ohio protects on the one hand the state's legitimate interest in the finality of its judgments and ensures on the other hand that any claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are promptly examined and resolved.**

{¶ 4} "Ohio and other states 'may erect reasonable procedural requirements for triggering the right to an adjudication,' *Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.* (1982), 455 U.S. 422, 437, 102 S.Ct 1148, 71 L.Ed 2d 265, and that is what Ohio has done by creating a 90-day deadline for the filing of applications to reopen. [Applicant] could have retained new attorneys

after the court of appeals issued its decision in 1994, or he could have filed the application on his own. What he could not do was ignore the rule's filing deadline. * * * **The 90-day requirement in the rule is 'applicable to all appellants,'** *State v. Winstead* (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 277, 278, 658 N.E.2d 722, and Applicant offers no sound reason why he – unlike so many other Ohio criminal defendants – could not comply with that fundamental aspect of the rule.” (Emphasis added.) *State v. Gumm*, 103 Ohio St.3d 162, 2004-Ohio-4755, 814 N.E.2d 861, at ¶7. See, also, *State v. LaMar*, 102 Ohio St.3d 467, 2004-Ohio-3976, 812 N.E.2d 970; *State v. Cooley*, 73 Ohio St.3d 411, 1995-Ohio-328, 653 N.E.2d 252; *State v. Reddick*, 72 Ohio St.3d 88, 1995-Ohio-249, 647 N.E.2d 784.

{¶ 5} Herein, Hall is attempting to reopen the appellate judgment that was journalized on February 17, 2009. The application for reopening was not filed until June 29, 2010, more than 90 days after journalization of the appellate judgement in *State v. Hall*, supra. Hall, in an attempt to show “good cause” for the untimely filing of her application for reopening, raises the issues of reliance upon her attorney and lack of knowledge. Reliance upon appellate counsel does not establish good cause for the untimely filing of an application for reopening. *State v. White* (Jan. 31, 1991), Cuyahoga App. No. 57944, reopening disallowed (Oct. 19, 1994), Motion No. 249174; *State v. Allen* (Nov. 3, 1994), Cuyahoga App. No. 65806, reopening disallowed (July 8, 1996), Motion No. 267054. See,

also, *State v. Moss* (May 13, 1993), Cuyahoga App. Nos. 62318 and 62322, reopening disallowed (Jan. 16, 1997), Motion No. 275838; *State v. McClain* (Aug. 3, 1995), Cuyahoga App. No. 67785, reopening disallowed (Apr. 15, 1997), Motion No. 276811; *State v. Russell* (May 9, 1996), Cuyahoga App. No. 69311, reopening disallowed (June 16, 1997), Motion No. 282351. In addition, lack of knowledge or ignorance of the time constraint applicable to an application for reopening per App.R. 26(B) does not provide sufficient cause for untimely filing. *State v. Klein* (Mar. 28, 1991), Cuyahoga App. No. 58389, reopening disallowed (Mar. 15, 1994), Motion No. 249260, affirmed (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 1481; *State v. Trammell* (July 13, 1995), Cuyahoga App. No. 67834, reopening disallowed (Apr. 22, 1996), Motion No. 270493; *State v. Travis* (Apr. 5, 1990), Cuyahoga App. No. 56825, reopening disallowed (Nov. 2, 1994), Motion No. 251073, affirmed (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 317. See, also, *State v. Torres*, Cuyahoga App. No. 86530, 2007-Ohio-3696, reopening disallowed (Jan. 3, 2007), Motion No. 390254; *State v. Gaston* (Feb. 7, 2002), Cuyahoga App. No. 79626, reopening disallowed (Jan 17,2007), Motion No. 391555.

{¶ 6} Herein, Hall has failed to establish “a showing of good cause” for the untimely filing of her application for reopening, as premised on a reliance upon her attorney or lack of knowledge.

{¶ 7} Accordingly, the application for reopening is denied.

FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., JUDGE

CHRISTINE T. MCMONAGLE, P.J., and
LARRY A. JONES, J., CONCUR