FILED: July 25, 2012

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON

In the Matter of D. M., M. M., K. M., and D. M., Children.

DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

M. R. and E. M., Respondents.

Multnomah County Circuit Court 2006806982, 2006806983, 2006806984, 2006806985

Petition Number 108263M

A149109

Susan M. Svetkey, Judge.

Argued and submitted on January 11, 2012.

Cecil A. Reniche-Smith, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for appellant. On the brief were John R. Kroger, Attorney General, Anna M. Joyce, Solicitor General, and Laura S. Anderson, Senior Assistant Attorney General.

Angela Sherbo argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent M. R.

No appearance for respondent E. M.

Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, and Brewer, Judge, and Sercombe, Judge.

BREWER, J.

Affirmed.

BREWER, J.

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2 The Department of Human Services (DHS) appeals from an order of the 3 juvenile court that denied its motion to unseal mother's DHS records in a previous juvenile dependency case in which mother was a dependent child. Because we conclude 4 5 that the court did not in fact seal those records, we find no error in its denial of the state's 6 motion, and affirm. 7 When mother was a minor, she was a dependent child within the 8 jurisdiction of the Multnomah County Juvenile Court. In July 2006, mother made 9 admissions in a juvenile court dependency proceeding in the same court involving 10 mother's eldest child. In the ensuing judgment, the court ordered that "reports and other 11 material relating to mother's 'history and prognosis' contained in mother's dependency file 12 are privileged and as such shall be removed from any file in this her child's dependency 13 and any reference to that material shall be redacted from social file in this case." On 14 September 25, 2010, DHS received a report of possible child abuse or neglect regarding 15 mother's second eldest child, D. M., who had sustained a burn on her arm. The child was seen at CARES, where a DHS caseworker disclosed information about mother's juvenile 16 17 records to the CARES personnel who, in turn, recited it in a report that was provided to 18 the parties. 19 At some point thereafter, DHS entered into a "voluntary service agreement" 20 with mother which provided for further evaluations and a "safety plan" for the children to

remain at home with mother. While mother was unrepresented by counsel and

1 participating in the voluntary service agreement, she agreed to participate in two new

2 evaluations. Among the materials that DHS provided to both evaluators were evaluations

of mother that DHS obtained when she was a minor and in DHS's custody as a foster

4 child.

On February 1, 2011, a DHS caseworker talked to one of the current case evaluators. The next day the caseworker reviewed the other evaluator's report. On February 3, DHS filed a petition asserting that D. M. and her three younger siblings were within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. On the same day, the court entered a shelter order, and counsel was appointed for mother. The records that DHS provided to the court and all parties at the shelter hearing included the CARES evaluation of D. M. and various assessment documents which referred to evaluations of mother that occurred while she was a ward of the juvenile court.

On March 14, DHS submitted a court report to all the parties noting that mother had been evaluated by Dr. Basham and Dr. King while she was a ward in 2001. The report stated, "Please see Social File for the above mentioned evaluations." Before the date set for a jurisdictional hearing on the petition, the state filed two motions to disclose mother's protected health information from her current case evaluations, which included information pertaining to her earlier wardship evaluations. On April 21, a hearing on the state's motions to disclose and a case settlement conference were concurrently scheduled. Before the motions to disclose could be heard, mother waived her right to a hearing on the dependency petition and made admissions that established

1	juvenile court jurisdiction over her four youngest children. The admissions were the						
2	product of negotiations between mother and the state, and no evidence was offered or						
3	taken at the hearing. The admissions were:						
4 5	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·						
6 7	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·						
8 9 10	"2C. Mother needs the assistance of the court and social service providers and an array of comprehensive services which will assist her to safely parent."						
11	The parties and the juvenile court then discussed the 2006 order. The court						
12	indicated that its 2006 order applied to both the DHS file and the court's social file.						
13 14 15 16	"[THE COURT]: Anything, any materials that the agency had in- how do I say thisIn [mother's] child's or children's file that they got from her file when she was a child, her dependency case, had to be removed from						
17	"[STATE'S ATTORNEY]: the child's						
18 19	"[THE COURT]: I could giveback into her dependency file and treated as privileged. That was my intent.						
20	"[STATE'S ATTORNEY]: Ok.						
21 22 23 24 25	"[THE COURT]: So just because you happen to, your client happened to have an evaluation that was done when she was, I don't know, 13 years old, when she was a dependent child, you can't use that. That was my ruling at the time. You can't use thatYou can't access thatYou can't do anything with that now.						
26	"[STATE'S ATTORNEY]: For that child.						
27	"[THE COURT]: All children.						

1	"[STATE'S ATTORNEY]: Ok. It says specifically 'in this her
2 3	child's dependency' case and then again 'in this case.' So I guess that would be the agency's first issue is that this was read to apply to that child. So
4 5	"[THE COURT]: [STATE'S ATTORNEY], is there any dispute that the agency didn't do what I told them to do? How else would they have this
6	paperwork?
7	"* * * * *
8	"[THE COURT]: Ok, cause I'm not going to re-litigate this. It says
9	that the material is privileged and as such shall be removed from any file in
10	this her child's dependency case and any reference to that materials shall be
11 12	redacted from the social file in this case. So there's an 'and' and there's two different kinds of files.
12	"ICTATEIC ATTODNEY!. Co. Ob so they the count the just twin a
13 14	"[STATE'S ATTORNEY]: So, Ok, so then the court, I'm just trying to make sure I'm understanding correctly. So the court's position is that we
15	cannot use anything from the person who is now the mom, we cannot use
16	anything from her dependency file when she was a dependent in our care,
17	as we move forward to evaluate safety concerns on her children who have
18	now come in to care."
19	The court and parties further discussed the application of the 2006 order to
20	the current case, with DHS taking the position that mother's earlier wardship evaluations
21	provided pertinent background for any new psychological evaluation in this case:
22	"If the court were to say you cannot use the evals that were done when this
23	was a voluntary case because you used things that I told you not to use.
24	Fine. Then we'll talk about how do we move forward maybe, and [mother's
25	attorney] talked about maybe starting fresh with a new evaluator. But then
26	the issue becomes, what can the agency provide to that new evaluator in
27	terms of making sure that the evaluator has what we feel to be a full range
28	of enough information that he understands the history of the case without
29 30	running afoul of the court's order * * *. And so that's where it becomes relevant now."
31	In the judgment that it entered following the April 21, 2011, hearing, the
32	court accepted mother's admissions took jurisdiction, and ordered mother to

2 3 4 5	housing and/or maintain such housing; maintain regular visitation with the children, as arranged by DHS; maintain contact with DHS and keep the agency advised of current contact information at all times; attend children's doctor's appointments as appropriate; cooperate with DD services or ARC."					
6	The court deferred ordering a further psychological evaluation for mother,					
7	and it also deferred ordering mother to sign releases for all services. In a section of the					
8	judgment entitled "Additional Finding of Fact Related to Disposition" the court said:					
9 10 11 12 13	light of this court's order re [mother's] childhood dependency file. The court encourages the parties to try to settle this issue. The court will not					
14	That judgment was entered on May 2, and there was no appeal from it.					
15	On May 22, 2011, DHS filed two additional motions in the juvenile court.					
16	In a "Motion to Clarify Judgment," DHS asked the court to "clarify" the meaning of its					
17	2006 judgment, "whether the use of the word 'removal' [sic] meant to remove and destroy					
18	records, or to seal the record." In the motion to clarify, the state posited:					
19 20 21 22 23	"If the court intended DHS to sealbut not remove any records from mother's dependency file, the agency can and will do so. In that event, however, the agency moves this court to unseal the file for the reasons described in its accompanying Motion to Unseal Mother's DHS Records As A Dependent."					
24	In the conclusion of the motion, the state requested that "the judgment be clarified.					
25	Specifically, whether the use of the word 'removal' meant to remove and destroy records,					
26	or to seal the record." The second motion was entitled "Motion to Unseal Mother's DHS					
27	Records as a Dependent." In its introductory paragraph, that motion stated that, "[i]f the					
28	court clarifies its past judgment and explains that DHS should seal mother's records as a					

1 dep	endent, DHS	moves this c	court to unseal	the records	for use in	ı this de	pendency	case."
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Mother filed a reply memorandum to the motions, and the court heard
argument on the motions. No evidence was offered and no offer of proof was made at
that hearing. Ultimately, the court entered an order denying both the motion for
clarification and the motion to unseal. The state's appeal from the portion of the order
denying its motion to unseal mother's DHS records is now before us.

The most straightforward resolution of the case begins with framing the
issue on appeal in accordance with the state's brief. As explained in its brief, "[t]he state
seeks reversal of the juvenile court's Order denying its Motion to Unseal Mother's DHS

9 seeks reversal of the juvenile court's Order denying its Motion to Unseal Mother's DHS
10 Records as a Dependent." In its assignment of error, the state asserts that "[t]he juvenile
11 court erred in applying its 2006 judgment to the separate juvenile court proceedings
12 regarding [D. M. and her three younger siblings] and in denying DHS's motion to unseal
13 mother's records as a dependent." Finally, the state urges this court to reverse

"[t]he juvenile court's judgment denying DHS's motion to unseal mother's dependency file * * * and * * * remand[] to the juvenile court with instruction to allow DHS to access and share history and prognoses in mother's juvenile dependency with mother's service providers, including mental health evaluators. In the alternative, this court should reverse and remand with instruction that the juvenile court review mother's juvenile court dependency and DHS files to determine whether information contained therein is relevant to services required in mother's case plan."

We belabor the state's position at length in order to explain why we are unable to reach the merits of its arguments about whether mother's wardship records are

The state does not suggest that the juvenile court applied the 2006 judgment to this proceeding other than by denying DHS's motion to unseal mother's records.

1 subject to use or disclosure in this dependency case involving her own children.² It is

2 axiomatic that, for a court to unseal a record, that record must have previously been

3 sealed. As noted, the trial court denied the motion to clarify the 2006 judgment. In doing

4 so, the court did not indicate that it had, in fact, "sealed" mother's dependency records;

5 rather, as indicated in the 2006 judgment itself, and as the court reiterated at the hearing

6 that resulted in the April 21, 2011, judgment, the court (1) directed DHS to remove

7 mother's dependency records from the juvenile court case file and return them to her own

8 DHS wardship dependency file; and (2) adhered to its conclusion in the 2006 judgment

that those records were privileged.

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A designation of a record as privileged is not tantamount to an order sealing it. A party can seek disclosure of privileged documents and, upon a proper record that may include an offer of proof or an *in camera* inspection of records, the court can determine issues relating to the scope of the privilege, whether it is subject to one or more exceptions, and various other issues that may be pertinent to a particular request for disclosure. *See, e.g., A. G. v. Guitron*, 351 Or 465, 484, 268 P3d 589 (2011) (noting that ORCP 44 C may require disclosure of documents that are otherwise privileged); *Kahn v. Pony Express Courier Corp.*, 173 Or App 127, 134, 20 P3d 837, *rev den*, 332 Or 518, (2001) (holding that a party seeking disclosure of privileged material must show that material is subject to exception to privilege). In fact, as noted, the state filed two such

The merits of that argument involve the interplay of various statutes in the juvenile dependency code, including ORS 419A.225, ORS 419A.255, and ORS 419B.035.

- 1 motions for disclosure of mother's current evaluations in this case, which included
- 2 information pertaining to her earlier wardship evaluations. However, the juvenile court
- 3 has yet to formally decide those motions.
- 4 Sealing, by contrast, refers to the process of closing a record and preventing
- 5 access to it. See Black's Law Dictionary 1376 (8th ed 2004). Thus, "sealing" is
- 6 sometimes used as a method to effectuate the expunction of a judicial record. See, e.g.,
- 7 ORS 419A.260(b) (providing, in part, that "expunction" means "[t]he removal and
- 8 destruction or sealing of a judgment or order"). In the absence of specific statutory
- 9 authority to do so, courts lack inherent authority to order the sealing of judicial records.
- 10 Cox v. M. A. L., 239 Or App 350, 354, 244 P3d 828 (2010).
- In this case, there is no indication that the juvenile court ever sealed
- mother's wardship records. Nor does DHS point to any order in which it cogently asserts
- 13 that the court did so. For that reason, we cannot say that the juvenile court erred in
- denying DHS's motion to unseal. It may be that a future opportunity will arise in this
- 15 case for the parties to litigate the merits of the state's assertion that ORS 419A.255 does
- 16 not bar the disclosure or use of mother's dependency records in this proceeding involving
- 17 her own children. However, that opportunity is not presented in this appeal which, as
- 18 noted, concerns only the denial of the motion to unseal, not the earlier jurisdictional
- 19 judgments from which DHS did not appeal.
- Affirmed.