

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: A.H., A MINOR

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: R.H., NATURAL FATHER

No. 1068 MDA 2013

Appeal from the Decree entered May 13, 2013,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County,
Orphans' Court, at No: A-8007

BEFORE: OTT, STABILE, and MUSMANNO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:

FILED MAY 23, 2014

R.H. ("Father") appeals from the decree entered on May 13, 2013, in the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County, involuntarily terminating his parental rights to his son, A.H. ("Child"), born in February of 2007.¹ We affirm.

This appeal arises from petitions filed by the Luzerne County Children and Youth Services ("CYS") on February 13, 2013, for the involuntary termination of parental rights of Father and C.H. ("Mother") pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b). The orphans' court held a hearing on the petitions on April 25, 2013, and May 10, 2013. Preliminarily, on April 25, 2013, CYS withdrew its request for termination of Father's parental rights under section 2511(a)(2) and (5) and proceeded during the hearing

¹ By separate decree entered on May 13, 2013, the orphans' court involuntarily terminated the parental rights of C.H., Child's mother, from which she filed a notice of appeal. The disposition of C.H.'s appeal is by separate memorandum.

with its petition under section 2511(a)(8) and (b) only. **See** N.T., 4/25/13, at 2. Further, counsel for CYS stipulated on the record and in open court that, although Father had a history of drug and alcohol use, CYS is not basing its petition against Father on drug and alcohol use. *Id.* at 16. CYS presented the testimony of twelve witnesses.² In addition, Father testified *via* telephone on his own behalf.

The record reveals that CYS first became involved with this family in 2009, due to a report alleging domestic violence, substance abuse, and mental health issues of Father and Mother. N.T., 4/25/13, at 110. On September 22, 2010, Child was adjudicated dependent. Child remained in the physical custody of his parents for the first six months of his dependency, until March 16, 2011, at which time Father signed a voluntary placement agreement. *Id.* at 114. At some time on or before the date of Child's placement, Father tested positive for cocaine. *Id.* Child has resided with the same foster family since August 27, 2011, and they desire to adopt him. *Id.* at 133.

By decree dated May 10, 2013, and entered on May 13, 2013, the orphans' court involuntarily terminated Father's parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8) and (b). On June 12, 2013, Father timely filed a

² The following witnesses were relevant to CYS's petition involving Father: Lenora Herrmann-Finn, Ph.D., a clinical psychologist who performed a psychological evaluation of Father, Child's mother, and Child; Cindy Jones, the current CYS caseworker for the family; and Linda Kistler, Child's counselor at Catholic Social Services.

notice of appeal and a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).

On appeal, Father presents two issues for our review:

I. Did the [orphans'] court err when it found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the conditions which led to placement of the minor child continue to exist and termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child?

II. Did the [orphans'] court err when it found that it would be in the child's best interest for [Father's] parental rights to be terminated?

Father's Brief at 2.³

We review this appeal according to the following standard:

[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard when considering a trial court's determination of a petition for termination of parental rights. As in dependency cases, our standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record. *In re: R.J.T.*, 608 Pa. 9, 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion. *Id.*; *R.I.S.*, 614 Pa. 275, 284, [___ Pa. ___, ___, 36 A.3d 567, 572 (Pa. 2011) (plurality opinion)]. As has been often stated, an abuse of discretion does not result merely because the reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion. *Id.*; *see also Samuel Bassett v. Kia Motors America, Inc.*, 613 Pa. 371, 34 A.3d 1, 51 (Pa. 2011); *Christianson v. Ely*, [575 Pa. 647, 654-655], 838 A.2d 630, 634 (Pa. 2003). Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. *Id.*

As we discussed in *R.J.T.*, there are clear reasons for applying an abuse of discretion standard of review in these cases. We

³ Father's brief is unpaginated.

observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during the relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other hearings regarding the child and parents. **R.J.T.**, [608 Pa. at 28-30], 9 A.3d at 1190. Therefore, even where the facts could support an opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the record and the court's legal conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of discretion. **In re Adoption of Atencio**, [539 Pa. 161, 165,] 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 (Pa. 1994).

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-827 (Pa. 2012).

Termination of parental rights is governed by section 2511 of the Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis.

Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the court must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating parental rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent's conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court determines that the parent's conduct warrants termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citing 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511).

The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the asserted statutory grounds for seeking the termination of parental rights are valid. **In re R.N.J.**, 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009).

Instantly, the orphans' court terminated Father's parental rights pursuant to section 2511(a)(8) and (b), which provide as follows:

(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds:

* * *

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of removal or placement, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist and termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.

* * *

(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8), (b).

This Court has stated:

In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8), the following factors must be demonstrated: (1) the child has been removed from parental care for 12 months or more from the date of removal; (2) the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist; and (3) termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.

In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1275–1276 (Pa. Super. 2003); 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8).

“Section 2511(a)(8) sets a 12-month time frame for a parent to remedy the conditions that led to the children’s removal by the court.” ***In re A.R.***, 837 A.2d 560, 564 (Pa. Super. 2003). Once the twelve-month period has been established, the court must next determine whether the conditions that led to the child’s removal continue to exist, despite the reasonable good faith efforts of CYF supplied over a realistic period. ***Id.*** Termination under section 2511(a)(8) does not require the court to evaluate a parent’s current willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that initially caused placement or the availability or efficacy of CYF services. ***In re Adoption of T.B.B.***, 835 A.2d 387, 396 (Pa. Super. 2003); ***In re Adoption of M.E.P., supra.*** The “relevant inquiry in this regard is whether the conditions that led to removal have been remedied and thus whether reunification of parent and child is imminent at the time of the hearing.” ***In re I.J.***, 972 A.2d 5, 11 (Pa. Super. 2009).

This Court has acknowledged:

[T]he application of Section (a)(8) may seem harsh when the parent has begun to make progress toward resolving the problems that had led to removal of her children. By allowing for termination when the conditions that led to removal continue to exist after a year, the statute implicitly recognizes that a child’s life cannot be held in abeyance while the parent is unable to perform the actions necessary to assume parenting responsibilities. This Court cannot and will not subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and stability to a parent’s claims of progress and hope for the future.

In re J.F.M., 71 A.3d 989, 997 (Pa. Super. 2013) (quoting ***I.J.***, 972 A.2d at 11–12).

With respect to the “needs and welfare” analysis pertinent to section 2511 (a)(8) and (b), we have observed:

[I]nitially, the focus in terminating parental rights is on the parent, under Section 2511(a), whereas the focus in Section 2511(b) is on the child. However, Section 2511(a)(8) explicitly requires an evaluation of the “needs and welfare of the child” prior to proceeding to Section 2511(b), which focuses on the “developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” Thus, the analysis under Section 2511(a)(8) accounts for the needs of the child in addition to the behavior of the parent. Moreover, only if a court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his or her parental rights, pursuant to Section 2511(a), does a court “engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the child.” Accordingly, while both Section 2511(a)(8) and Section 2511(b) direct us to evaluate the “needs and welfare of the child,” we are required to resolve the analysis relative to Section 2511(a)(8), prior to addressing the “needs and welfare” of [the child], as proscribed by Section 2511(b); as such, they are distinct in that we must address Section 2511(a) before reaching Section 2511(b).

In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1008–1009 (Pa. Super. 2008) (*en banc*) (citations omitted).

With respect to subsection 2511(b), this Court has explained the requisite analysis as follows:

Subsection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the child. In ***In re C.M.S.***, 884 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005), this Court stated, “Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in the inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child.” In addition, we instructed that the trial court must also discern

the nature and status of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing that bond. **Id.** However, in cases where there is no evidence of a bond between a parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. **In re K.Z.S.**, 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super. 2008). Accordingly, the extent of the bond-effect analysis necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular case. **Id.** at 63.

In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010).

In his first issue on appeal, Father argues the evidence was insufficient to support termination pursuant to the second factor of section 2511(a)(8), *i.e.*, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist, and the third factor, *i.e.*, termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child. We disagree.

In its opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), the orphans' court found as follows with respect to section 2511(a)(8):

Based on the testimony of Dr. [Herrmann-]Finn, Ms. Kistler, and Ms. Jones, the [c]ourt finds Father's parenting issues continue to exist. Father had continued to minimize the impact the period of separation had on [Child] while Father was still residing in Pennsylvania and even after Father relocated to Ohio. Father had the option to remain in Pennsylvania and complete his required services, yet Father chose to relocate to Ohio[,] which eliminated any existing bond he had with [Child]. Since the child's placement, Father failed to recognize that maintaining personal contact with his child is significant to the child's security and welfare. The [c]ourt finds that as of the date of filing of the Petition, [] Father's parenting issues continue[d] to exist.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/11/13, at 36. In addition, based on the testimony of Dr. Herrmann-Finn, Ms. Kistler, and Ms. Jones, the court found that termination of Father's parental rights would best serve Child's needs and

welfare in that Father's inconsistent contact had a negative impact on Child, and Child did not have a bond with Father. *Id.* at 37. The testimonial evidence supports the court's findings.

Lenora Herrmann-Finn, Ph.D., a clinical psychologist, performed a psychological evaluation of Father on December 9, 2011, at the request of CYS. Dr. Herrmann-Finn noted that, on the date she saw Father, he had just started supervised visits again with Child, having had no contact with Child from July of 2011, through November of 2011, when he was living in Scranton, Lackawanna County. N.T., 4/25/13, at 22-23. With respect to Father's approach to parenting, Dr. Herrmann-Finn testified that his "profile suggested a disorganized approach to parenting." *Id.* at 25. Dr. Herrmann-Finn testified as follows on direct examination regarding Father:

When I talked with [Father] about – as I would with any parent about the reasons for a child going into placement, [Father] was very clear in his tendency to minimize a number of areas. First, he minimized his own involvement in the placement of the child, focus[ing] on his wife as the irresponsible parent. He minimized the impact on [Child] of any domestic violence that he may have witnessed. And [Father] said to me all he did was push [Mother] around a few times.

And, thirdly, and probably the most important, [Father] minimized the impact on [Child] of that long period of separation from him. And remember, he had been gone from July until November of 2011. When I asked [Father] about that, how do you think the child felt that you were gone from his life, [Father's] statement to was, ^[n]it gave him more time to see his mom.^[n] So from [Father's] p[er]spective the child was not affected by that gap of time. That was an area that I clearly state in the report as something that needs to be addressed. [Father] needed to develop a clearer understanding of the impact of his behavior on his child.

Id. at 25-26. Dr. Herrmann-Finn further testified that, “[Father] did not see his own role in this child’s placement and in this child’s continued adjustment and adaptation.” *Id.* at 26. She recommended, in part, that Father continue to participate in supervised visits on a weekly basis with Child. *Id.* at 29. Dr. Herrmann-Finn explained on direct examination that it would have been important for Child to have consistency in visitation with Father as follows:

[A]s I stated before [Child] was very confused about parenting figures. He was [age] four when I saw him, a very crucial age when you should already have established who parents are. And if you have a parenting figure that’s coming in and out of a child’s life it does nothing but create more confusion and more confusion leads to more issues with behavior and more issues with behavior leads to problems with the environment.

Id. at 29-30.

Indeed, Dr. Herrmann-Finn testified Child was “showing some significant behavior issues” at the time of his psychological evaluation in August of 2011. *Id.* at 28. She continued on direct examination:

It was difficult for [Child] to share, he was physically aggressive with the other children. He would break toys if he could not get them. He had significant temper tantrums which involved aggressive acting out. He was attending a Head Start Program and he was receiving some behavior management intervention but that was unsuccessful. At the point I saw [him] they were thinking about putting him in a partial hospitalization program.

Id. Dr. Herrmann-Finn diagnosed Child with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (“ADHD”), of the combined type, and borderline intellectual functioning. N.T., 4/25/13, at 28. Dr. Herrmann-Finn testified Child “was

testing out with a level functioning at one year, nine months [old].” *Id.* at 38.

Cindy Jones, the CYS caseworker, testified she discussed Child’s behavioral issues with Father on “many occasions,” and Father’s responses were not appropriate. N.T., 4/25/13, at 125. Ms. Jones testified that, after Child’s placement on March 16, 2011, CYS arranged for Father to have weekly supervised visits. *Id.* at 118. She testified that, initially, upon Child’s placement, Father “indicated that visiting with his son would be too difficult for him.” N.T., 4/25/13, at 117. In 2011, Father only participated in supervised visits on April 15, 2011, May 23, 2011, and then not again until December 1, 2011.⁴ *Id.* at 117.

Ms. Jones testified that, in May of 2011, CYS amended Father’s family service plan (“FSP”) objectives to include participating in a parenting program due to Father’s inconsistent visits with Child. *Id.* at 119-120. Prior to the filing of the termination petition, Father had not enrolled in or completed any parenting program. *Id.* at 132.

Ms. Jones testified Father consistently attended supervised visits from December 1, 2011, through March 6, 2012, the last date Father saw Child. *Id.* at 123-124. Father participated in supervised visits only thirteen times

⁴ Ms. Jones testified Father expressed interest in resuming visits in September of 2011. She requested that, before a visit is scheduled, he come into her facility for a meeting with her. N.T., 4/25/13, at 122. Ms. Jones testified the meeting did not occur until November of 2011, because Father cancelled several meeting dates.

during the entire time Child has been in placement. *Id.* at 124. On April 23, 2013, Ms. Jones learned that Father had relocated to Toledo, Ohio, where he remained at the time of the termination hearing. *Id.* at 128, 132. Ms. Jones testified on direct examination:

Q. Did the natural father ever provide to you either personally or through his attorney the reasons for his relocation?

A. He had – on one occasion he explained that the constables were looking for him, that he had to leave the Rescue Mission [a Christian[-]based drug and alcohol recovery program in Wilkes-Barre] because he had to get a job. On another occasion he presented to me that the Rescue Mission was not teaching the Bible the way he thought it should be taught. And another occasion he said he just picked a random place that provided a six-month drug and alcohol program. And finally he said he would be closer to family for support.

Id. at 128.

Significantly, with respect to Father's parenting skills, Ms. Jones testified on direct examination:

Q. Has the natural father demonstrated to you at any point in time that he understands the impact that his inconsistency [in visits] has on his child?

A. No, he hasn't.

Q. Why do you say that?

A. He left this area without notifying [CYS] that he was planning to do that or inquiring as to how that would affect the reunification process with his son. He failed to say good-bye to his son, provide any explanation to him on his level as to why he was leaving. And he's continually placed his own needs above the child's.

Q. As we sit here today do you believe that the minor child could be returned to his natural father's custody?

A. No.

Q. Why do you say that?

A. [CYS] has severe concerns regarding [Father's] continued lack of understanding of his role as a parent to [Child]. He hasn't seen the child now in a year and he hasn't provided any support or parental guidance for [Child]. In fact, when he did have phone conversations with me he didn't even inquire as to [Child's] well-being.

Id. at 132-133.

Finally, Linda Kistler, a licensed professional counselor and board certified art therapist, testified that she began treating Child in September of 2012, through the time of the termination hearing. N.T., 5/10/13, at 14. She testified that, beginning in December of 2012, and early 2013, Child "really gained control" of his behavior in school and at home. *Id.* at 16. She explained that Child's foster family, with whom he has resided since August 27, 2011, recently moved, resulting in him having to change schools, and that Child has "done beautifully" in adjusting to his new school. *Id.* Similarly, Ms. Jones, the CYS caseworker, testified relating to Child's emotional well-being, "[h]e has his ups and downs. He has some work to do yet but overall he is stabilized." N.T., 4/25/13, at 135. Further, Ms. Jones testified that Child has no bond with Father. She testified that "[Child] has not seen [Father] in a year and any bond that did exist is now gone." N.T., 4/25/13, at 137.

We conclude that the foregoing testimonial evidence supports the orphans' court's determination that Father's conduct warrants termination pursuant to § 2511(a)(8). By the time of the termination hearing, Child had been in placement for more than two years, far in excess of the 12-month statutory timeframe. The conditions that led to Child's placement continued to exist in that Father had not seen Child in one year or expressed any understanding of the impact his absence has on Child. Finally, the testimonial evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates that termination of Father's parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of Child.

In so concluding, we reject Father's argument that the court abused its discretion in finding that Father "had the option to remain in Pennsylvania and complete his required services, yet Father chose to relocate to Ohio" Trial Court Opinion, 7/11/13, at 36. There is no evidentiary support in the certified record before this Court that Father could not complete drug and alcohol rehabilitation in Pennsylvania. Moreover, to the extent the court's decision in this regard is based on credibility findings in favor of Ms. Jones and against Father, we will not disturb it. ***See In re Adoption of S.P.***, 47 A.3d at 827 (stating that appellate courts "must resist the urge to second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility determinations and judgment").

Likewise, we reject Father's argument that the court abused its discretion in finding that he did not recognize the importance of maintaining

personal contact with Child because he requested telephone contact with Child once he relocated to Ohio, but CYS did not permit it. Father argues CYS violated a court order dated May 30, 2012, directing “biweekly on a random basis drug screens to be conducted, frequent phone contact with the natural parents.” N.T., 4/25/13, at 145-146.

Ms. Jones testified that, on May 1, 2012, shortly after he moved to Ohio, Father requested telephone contact with Child. N.T., 4/25/13, at 128-129. CYS referred Child to Linda Kistler, the counselor at Catholic Social Services, for a determination regarding whether telephone contact with Father was in Child’s best interest. *Id.* at 129. Ms. Kistler testified that, in January or February of 2013, she expressed her concern to CYS that allowing telephone contact with Father, who had not seen Child since March 6, 2012, “would [cause] some regression in [Child’s] progress that he had made in controlling his behavior, his choices that he was making both at home and at school.” N.T., 5/10/13, at 27-28. Ms. Jones testified that, upon discussing Father’s request for telephone contact with Ms. Kistler, CYS obtained a court order directing that there would be no telephone contact. N.T., 4/25/13, at 130.

Based on the foregoing testimonial evidence, we discern no abuse of discretion. Indeed, Father’s interest in telephone contact with Child after he moved to Ohio, even if permitted by CYS, does not demonstrate adequate parenting skills necessary to defeat termination under section 2511(a)(8).

See *In re J.F.M., supra* (stating “[t]his Court cannot and will not subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and stability to a parent’s claims of progress and hope for the future”).

With respect to section 2511(b), Father argues the evidence does not support that termination because will best serve Child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare. We disagree.

With respect to the bond analysis pursuant to section 2511(b), our Supreme Court confirmed that, “the mere existence of a bond or attachment of a child to a parent will not necessarily result in the denial of a termination petition.” ***In re T.S.M.***, 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). The Court further stated that, “[c]ommon sense dictates that courts considering termination must also consider whether the children are in a pre-adoptive home and whether they have a bond with their foster parents.” ***Id.*** at 268 (citation omitted). Moreover, the Court directed that, in weighing the bond considerations pursuant to section 2511(b), “courts must keep the ticking clock of childhood ever in mind.” The ***T.S.M.*** Court observed that, “[c]hildren are young for a scant number of years, and we have an obligation to see to their healthy development quickly. When courts fail . . . the result, all too often, is catastrophically maladjusted children.” ***Id.*** at 269.


Ms. Jones, the CYS caseworker, testified that Child’s foster parents meet his physical, developmental, and emotional needs, that he is “very

comfortable” with them, and that they desire to adopt him. N.T., 4/25/13, at 134-135. Further, there is no evidence of a parent-child bond between Father and Child. Ms. Jones testified that “[Child] has not seen [Father] in a year and any bond that did exist is now gone.” N.T., 4/25/13, at 137. **See *In re K.Z.S., supra*** (stating that, “in cases where there is no evidence of a bond between a parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists”).

Based on our review of the record evidence, we discern no abuse of discretion by the court in terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to section 2511(b) so that Child can obtain the permanence and stability he needs. We further observe that the Guardian ad Litem filed a brief in support of the court’s decision to terminate Father’s parental rights pursuant to section 2511(a)(8) and (b). Accordingly, we affirm the decree terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8) and (b).

Decree affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Joseph D. Seletyn", written over a horizontal line.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 5/23/2014