

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,	:	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
	:	PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee	:	
	:	
v.	:	
	:	
KEENAN BONDS,	:	
	:	
Appellant	:	No. 1989 EDA 2013

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence June 6, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division No(s): CP-51-CR-0014071-2011

BEFORE: BOWES, WECHT, and FITZGERALD,* JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.:

FILED JULY 17, 2014

Appellant, Keenan Bonds, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas following his convictions for possession of firearms by a prohibited person,¹ carrying a firearm without a license,² and carrying a firearm in public.³ Appellant challenges the weight of the evidence and the discretionary aspects of his sentence. We affirm.

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

¹ 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a)(1).

² 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106(a)(1).

³ 18 Pa.C.S. § 6108.

We adopt the facts set forth by the trial court's opinion. **See** Trial Ct. Op., 11/12/13, at 1-5. After a non-jury trial, Appellant was convicted on December 3, 2012. On January 18, 2013, the court sentenced Appellant to five to ten years' imprisonment. On February 5, 2013, Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration of sentence *nunc pro tunc*, which did not challenge the weight of the evidence. The court held a hearing on June 6, 2013, at which Appellant did not raise a weight claim. Subsequently, the court modified Appellant's sentence to four to ten years' imprisonment. Appellant timely appealed and timely filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement.

Appellant raises the following issues:

Was Appellant's conviction against the weight of the evidence?

Did the trial court issue a greater sentence than necessary?

Appellant's Brief at 3.

Initially, we note that a challenge to the weight of the evidence "concedes that there is sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict." **Commonwealth v. Widmer**, 744 A.2d 745, 751 (Pa. 2000). This Court cannot "entertain a challenge to the weight of the evidence since [its] examination is confined to the 'cold record.'" **Commonwealth v. Brown**, 648 A.2d 1177, 1191 (Pa. 1994) (citation omitted). We only review whether the trial court abused its discretion when it evaluated the challenge. **Id.** (limiting review of weight of evidence to whether trial court abused

discretion and not assessing credibility of witnesses). For these reasons, a challenge to the weight of evidence may not be raised for the first time on appeal. ***Id.***; ***see also*** Pa.R.A.P. 607(a). Thus, if the issue is not raised with the trial court initially, it is waived. ***Commonwealth v. Sherwood***, 982 A.2d 483, 494 (Pa. 2009). Instantly, Appellant did not challenge the weight of the evidence before the trial court. Accordingly, he has waived this claim.

See id.

With respect to Appellant's challenge to the discretionary aspects of his sentence:

To be reviewed on the merits, a challenge to the discretionary aspects of sentence must raise a substantial question that the sentence imposed is not appropriate. A substantial question is raised when the appellant advances a "colorable argument" that the sentence was either "inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code" or "contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process." This Court determines whether an appellant has raised a substantial question by examination of the appellant's concise statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal, which must be included in the appellant's brief, pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 2119(f). If a Rule 2119(f) statement is not included in the appellant's brief and the appellee objects to the omission, then this Court is precluded from reviewing the merits of the appellant's claim.

Commonwealth v. Faulk, 928 A.2d 1061, 1071-72 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). Instantly, Appellant has not included a Rule 2119(f) statement in his brief, and the Commonwealth has objected. Accordingly,


J. S45033/14

we are barred from reviewing the merits of Appellant's claim. ***See id.***

Therefore, we affirm the judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Joseph D. Seletyn", written over a horizontal line.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 7/17/2014

FILED

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS NOV 12 2013
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
TRIAL DIVISION - CRIMINAL SECTION
Criminal Appeals Unit
First Judicial District of PA

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

CP-51-CR-0014071-2011

:
:
:
:
:

VS.

CP-51-CR-0014071-2011 Comm. v. Bonds, Keenan
Opinion

SUPERIOR COURT
IO. 1989 EDA 2013

KEENAN BONDS



OPINION

WOELPPER, J.

NOVEMBER 12, 2013

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Following a December 3, 2012 waiver trial, the court found Defendant Keenan Bonds (“Defendant”) guilty of violations of the Uniform Firearms Act (“VUFA”)¹ and public urination.² On January 18, 2013,³ the court sentenced Defendant to five to ten years of incarceration on 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a)(1), four to eight years of incarceration on 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106(a)(1), and one to two years of incarceration on 18 Pa.C.S. § 6108. The court imposed no further penalty as to the public urination charge and ordered that all sentences run concurrent with one another.

On February 5, 2013, Defendant’s trial counsel filed a “*Nunc[er] Pro Tunc* Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence” (“motion for reconsideration”). A copy of the motion for

¹ The court found Defendant guilty of 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a)(1) (persons not to possess, use, manufacture, control, sell or transfer firearms), 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106(a)(1) (firearms not to be carried without a license), and 18 Pa.C.S. § 6108 (carrying firearms on public streets or public property in Philadelphia).

² CO § 10609.

³ The court deferred sentencing to allow time for a presentence investigation.

12

reconsideration is attached as Exhibit "A." Defendant petitioned the court to reduce his aggregate sentence from five to ten years of incarceration to four to eight years. *See* Exhibit "A" at ¶ 4. Defendant also argued that the four to eight year sentence imposed for his violation of section 6106 was illegal because it exceeded the seven-year statutory maximum sentence for a second-degree felony. *Id.* at ¶ 6. After a June 6, 2013 hearing, the court modified Defendant's sentence on the section 6105 and 6106 violations to four to ten years incarceration and three to six years incarceration, respectively. The balance of the sentence remained as originally ordered.

On July 3, 2013, Defendant filed a *pro se* notice of appeal. Jennifer Ann Santiago, Esquire was appointed as Defendant's appellate counsel and entered her appearance on July 5, 2013. Pursuant to the trial court's Pa. R.A.P. 1925(b) Order, Ms. Santiago filed a statement of the errors complained of on appeal ("Statement") on October 3, 2013.⁴ A copy of the Statement is attached as Exhibit "B." Through the Statement, Defendant alleges that:

1. The witness' credibility was called into question. Therefore, [Defendant] raises a weight of the evidence claim.
2. The Court's sentence of 4 to 10 years state incarceration was greater than necessary under 42 Pa. C.S. § 9781(d) and 42 Pa. C.S. § 9721(b). Therefore, [Defendant] raises a manifestly excessive sentence claim.

See Exhibit "B" at ¶¶ 1-2.

For the following reasons, Defendant's judgment of sentence should be affirmed.

⁴ On August 20, 2013, Ms. Santiago filed a motion for additional time to prepare the Statement because notes of testimony remained outstanding.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

At approximately 8:21 p.m. on July 16, 2011, Philadelphia police officers Angel Ortiz and Milor Celce were in an unmarked police vehicle in the area of 2200 North Broad Street in Philadelphia. Notes of Testimony (“N.T.”), Dec. 3, 2012 at pp. 10-12; 37. While driving northbound on Broad Street, the officers observed Defendant and another male (later identified as Eugene Colts (“Colts”)) standing outside a variety store. *Id.* at 24; 37-38. Defendant appeared to be urinating on the store’s outer wall. *Id.* at 12; 38. Officer Celce, who was driving the police vehicle, made a U-turn and pulled into a driveway adjacent to the store. *Id.* at 13; 38. As he was pulling over, Officer Celce observed a bulge in the right pocket of Defendant’s pants. *Id.* at 38. He alerted Officer Ortiz to the bulge. *Id.*

Both officers alighted from the vehicle. *Id.* at 13; 39. While Officer Celce approached Colts, Officer Ortiz approached Defendant and told him to put his hands up. *Id.* at 13; 26. Despite Officer Ortiz having repeated his order multiple times, Defendant continued to reach for his pockets and then began to walk away. *Id.* at 13. Only after Officer Ortiz put his hands on Defendant and directed him to put his hands on the wall, did Defendant comply. *Id.*

Officer Ortiz was concerned about the gun-shaped bulge in Defendant’s right pocket and began patting down Defendant’s waistband area. *Id.* at 13-14. When Defendant again attempted to get away, Officer Ortiz “got into a tussle” with him. *Id.* at 14. Officer Celce stepped in to assist as they “got [Defendant] down,” handcuffed him, and recovered a .38 special revolver, loaded with five rounds, from Defendant’s right pocket. *Id.* at 14-15.⁵ The revolver was operable and was owned by a woman named Latisse Williams (“Williams”). *Id.* at 53, 55-56.

⁵ Officer Ortiz recovered the firearm. N.T., Dec. 3, 2012 at p. 14.

Defendant did not have a license for the firearm, nor was he eligible to carry a firearm under 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105. *Id.* at 53.

Defendant testified on his own behalf and denied having possessed the firearm. He explained that Colts had taken it from Williams (Colt's girlfriend) and had been carrying it throughout the day. *Id.* at 63; 66. Defendant testified that while he was urinating outside of the store, he noticed Colts standing very close to him, fidgeting. *Id.* at 75-76. After Defendant finished urinating, two police officers approached him and told him to get against the wall. *Id.* at 68. When Defendant complied, he noticed the firearm lying on the ground. *Id.* He testified that the officers slammed him onto the ground, knocking out his front teeth. *Id.* at 69. When the officers recovered the firearm, Defendant told them it was not his. *Id.* at 69-70.⁶

III. LEGAL DISCUSSION

Defendant first argues that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence because the "witness' credibility was called into question." *See* Exhibit "B" at ¶ 1.⁷ Defendant, however, waived this claim by failing to raise it with the trial court either before sentencing or in a post-sentence motion. *See Commonwealth v. Lewis*, 45 A.3d 405, 410 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012). Nonetheless, even if Defendant had properly preserved the claim, it would fail. A new trial may be granted only if the verdict was so contrary to the evidence as to "shock one's sense of justice." *See Commonwealth v. Rossetti*, 863 A.2d 1185, 1191 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004), *appeal denied*, 878 A.2d 864 (Pa. 2005) (quoting *Commonwealth v. Hunter*, 554 A.2d 550, 555 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989)). It is the fact-finder's role to "believe all, part, or none of the evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses." *See Commonwealth v. Taylor*, 63 A.3d 327, 330 (Pa.

⁶ Following Defendant's testimony, the parties stipulated to *crimin falsi* evidence, specifically that Defendant was convicted of burglary graded as a second-degree felony in 2005. N.T., Dec. 3, 2012 at p. 86.

⁷ Defendant did not specify which witness's credibility was called into question.

Super. Ct. 2013) (quoting *Commonwealth v. Shaffer*, 40 A.3d 1250, 1253 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012)). The appellate court may not substitute its own judgment for that of the fact-finder. *Id.* Absent an abuse of discretion, the trial court's determination as to whether a new trial should be granted based on a weight of the evidence claim will be upheld. *Id.*

Here, acting as the fact-finder, the court carefully considered the testimony of all witnesses and ultimately found the accounts of Officers Ortiz and Celce to be most credible. *See Commonwealth v. Brown*, 71 A.3d 1009, 1014 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013) (it is for the fact-finder to determine which version of the events at issue to assign the most credibility). Both officers testified that they observed Defendant standing on a public street in Philadelphia with a suspicious bulge in his pocket, which was later confirmed to be a loaded revolver. N.T., Dec. 3, 2012 at pp. 13; 38. Based on this testimony, in addition to the parties' stipulations to a certificate of non-licensure and Defendant's ineligibility to possess a firearm, the verdict as to the VUFA charges was not against the weight of the evidence.⁸

Defendant's second argument is that because his aggregate sentence of four to ten years of incarceration was "greater than necessary," it was manifestly excessive. *See* Exhibit "B" at ¶ 2. This sentencing claim is reviewed for abuse of discretion. *See Commonwealth v. Provenzano*, 50 A.3d 148, 154 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012). "[A] sentencing court will not have abused its discretion unless the record discloses that the judgment exercised was manifestly unreasonable or the result

⁸ To be found guilty of a violation of Section 6108, the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was carrying a firearm, rifle, or shotgun on public streets or public property in Philadelphia and was neither licensed to carry the firearm nor exempt from licensing requirements. 18 Pa.C.S. § 6108. To be found guilty of a violation of Section 6106, the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was carrying a firearm concealed on or about his person (other than in his place of abode or fixed place of business) without a valid and lawfully issued license. 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106. To be found guilty of a violation of Section 6105, the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was part of a class of individuals prohibited from possessing a firearm. 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105. Finally, all witnesses to the subject incident (including Defendant) testified that Defendant was urinating while standing on a public street in Philadelphia. Therefore, to the extent Defendant is considered to have brought a timely weight of the evidence claim as to his conviction for public urination, that claim should fail.

of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will...” *Id.* (citation omitted). Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c), the appellate court shall affirm a defendant’s sentence unless the sentencing court (1) applied the sentencing guidelines erroneously, (2) sentenced the defendant within the guidelines, but the circumstances of the case make such application “clearly unreasonable,” or (3) sentenced the defendant outside the guidelines and that sentence is unreasonable. In fashioning its sentence, the court must consider the need to protect the public, the nature of the offense and impact on the victim, the defendant’s rehabilitative needs, and the Sentencing Guidelines. *See* 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b); *see also Commonwealth v. Hyland*, 875 A.2d 1175, 1184 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005), *appeal denied*, 890 A.2d 1057 (Pa. 2005), (quoting *Commonwealth v. Monahan*, 860 A.2d 180, 184 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004)).

Here, the court sentenced Defendant within the Sentencing Guidelines.⁹ Those guidelines recommend that an individual with Defendant’s prior record score (5) who unlawfully possessed a firearm under 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105 (offense gravity score of 10) be sentenced to a minimum of five to six years of incarceration, plus or minus one year. The court sentenced Defendant to four to ten years of incarceration on this charge.¹⁰ The guidelines recommend that an individual with Defendant’s prior record score who carried a firearm without a license in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106 (offense gravity score of 9) be sentenced to a minimum of four to five years of incarceration, plus or minus one year. The court sentenced Defendant to three to six years of incarceration on this charge.¹¹ Finally, the guidelines recommend that an individual with Defendant’s prior record score who unlawfully carried a firearm on the public streets of Philadelphia in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 6108 (offense gravity score of 5) be sentenced to a

⁹ The sentencing court applied the Sixth Edition, Revised guidelines to the subject offenses.

¹⁰ The court modified the sentence from five to ten years to four to ten years upon consideration of Defendant’s motion for reconsideration.


¹¹ The court modified the sentence from four to eight years to three to six years upon consideration of Defendant’s motion for reconsideration.

minimum of one to one and a half years, plus or minus three months. The court sentenced Defendant to one to two years of incarceration on this charge. All terms of incarceration ran concurrently. Therefore, Defendant's sentence fell squarely within the Sentencing Guidelines.¹²

In addition to accounting for Defendant's prior offense history and the gravity of the current offenses, the court considered Defendant's rehabilitative needs and any mitigating circumstances as set forth in Defendant's presentence investigation report. *See Commonwealth v. Fullin*, 892 A.2d 843, 849-850 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) ("Where the sentencing judge had the benefit of a pre-sentence report, it will be presumed that [she] was aware of relevant information regarding [defendant's] character and weighed those considerations along with the statutory mitigating factors") (internal quotations omitted). Finally, the court considered the Commonwealth's sentencing memorandum, arguments by counsel, and Defendant's allocution. The court also acknowledged CeaseFirePA¹³ and Defendant's mother's presence at the sentencing hearing. With all of these considerations in mind, the court fashioned a guideline sentence that was not "manifestly excessive."

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons herein, Defendant's judgment of sentence should be affirmed.

BY THE COURT:

WOELPPER, J.

¹² Again, no further penalty was imposed as to the public urination conviction, a summary offense.

¹³ CeaseFirePA is a coalition of citizens against gun violence. While a representative of the organization appeared, she had to leave before the sentencing hearing began. N.T., Jan. 18, 2013 at pp. 6-7.

RECEIVED

FEB 05 2013

**ACTIVE CRIMINAL RECORDS
CRIMINAL MOTION COURT**

EDWARD C. MEEHAN, JR. & ASSOCIATES
Edward C. Meehan Jr., Esquire
Attorney I.D. No. 55789
211 North 13th St., Suite 701
Philadelphia, PA 19107
215.564.4173

Attorney for KEENAN BONDS

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
CRIMINAL TRIAL DIVISION

VS.

CP-51-CR-0014071-2011
OTN: N 754670-0.

KEENAN BONDS
PP# 815750
SID#: 232-52-22-2

CHARGES: VUFA(F2).

ORDER FOR HEARING

AND NOW, this day of , 2013, it is **ORDERED** that a Hearing on the attached Motion shall be heard on the day of , 2013, at Courtroom 1005, Criminal Justice Center, at am., the Office of the District Attorney for Philadelphia County to show cause why the attached Motion to Reconsideration of Sentence should not be granted.

BY THE COURT:

J.

EDWARD C. MEEHAN, JR. & ASSOCIATES
Edward C. Meehan Jr., Esquire
Attorney I.D. No. 55789
211 North 13th St., Suite 701
Philadelphia, PA 19107
215.564.4173

Attorney for KEENAN BONDS

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
CRIMINAL TRIAL DIVISION

VS.

CP-51-CR-0014071-2011
OTN: N 754670-0.

KEENAN BONDS
PP# 815750
SID#: 232-52-22-2

CHARGES: VUFA(F2).

ORDER

AND NOW, this day of , 2012, it is hereby **ORDERED** that the petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence is **GRANTED**, petitioner's sentence on January , 2013 is **VACATED** and the new sentence is on VUFA (F2): 4 to 8 years of incarceration followed by 2 years of reporting probation. The sentence on all other counts is no further penalty.

BY THE COURT:

J.

EDWARD C. MEEHAN, JR. & ASSOCIATES
 Edward C. Meehan Jr., Esquire
 Attorney I.D. No. 55789
 211 North 13th St., Suite 701
 Philadelphia, PA 19107
 215.564.4173

Attorney for KEENAN BONDS

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA	:	COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
	:	CRIMINAL TRIAL DIVISION
	:	
VS.	:	CP-51-CR-0014071-2011
	:	OTN: N 754670-0.
	:	
KEENAN BONDS	:	CHARGES: VUFA(F2).
PP# 815750	:	
SID#: 232-52-22-2	:	

NUN PRO TUNC MOTION for RECONSIDERATION of SENTENCE

Defendant, **KEENAN BONDS**, through his attorney, **Edward C. Meehan, Jr., Esquire**, by this Nunc Pro Tunc Motion to Reconsider Sentence asks this Court to modify the petitioner's sentence in the above-captioned matters and in support of respectfully represents the following:

1. On or about July 16, 2011, petitioner was arrested in the above-captioned matter. He has been continuously incarcerated since that date
2. On December 3, 2012, petitioner had a non-jury trial before your Honor. Your Honor found petitioner guilty of all charges. Sentencing was deferred for a pre-sentence report.
3. On January 18, 2013, you Honor sentenced petitioner as follows: VUFA (F2) section 6105: 5 - 10 years incarceration; VUFA (F3) section 6106: 4 - 8 years incarceration and VUFA (M1) section 6108: 1 - 2 years incarceration and On Public urination: No further penalty. All sentences were to run concurrent to the other and petitioner was to receive time credit.
4. Petitioner is asking this Court to reconsider its sentence and reduce it to an

aggregate of 4-8 years. Petitioner is asking for reconsideration of the sentence.

5. Petitioner's sentencing guidelines were 60-72 months and the Commonwealth offered a Smart Room plea on 3-10 years. The petitioner waived his right to a jury trial and proceeded by a waiver trial. Certainly, by proceeded to trial, the petitioner cannot expect a sentence equal to the Commonwealth's pre-trial offer or a sentence 24 months below the guidelines. However, by waiving his right to a jury trial, petitioner is entitled to mitigation of his sentence. Further, petitioner's sentence must by law run consecutive to any set-back he receives from the Parole board. As a result, petitioner is twice punished for his 2005 burglary conviction: once for the 4 prior history points and second because any sentence he receives must, by law, run consecutive to his parole violation.

6. The sentence on VUFA (F3) 6106, according to the docket, is illegal, as the statutory maximum is 7 years on incarceration. The docket indicates a sentence of 4-8 years.

WHEREFORE, defendant prays that this Honorable Court grant this motion and agrees to modify the sentence.


Respectfully Submitted,



EDWARD C. MEEHAN JR.
Attorney for Keenan Bonds

VERIFICATION

The facts set forth in the foregoing are true and correct to the best of the undersigned's knowledge, information and belief, and are subject to penalties for unsworn falsification to authorities under Pennsylvania Crimes Code Section 4904 (18 Pa.C.S. Section 4904).



EDWARD C. MEEHAN JR., ESQUIRE

DATE: _____

2/5/13

LAW OFFICES OF JENNIFER A. SANTIAGO, PLLC

Jennifer A. Santiago, Esquire
Attorney ID # 310557
Land Title Building
100 South Broad Street, Suite 1419
Philadelphia, PA 19110
(215) 665-9143

Attorney for Appellant

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA	:	COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
	:	CRIMINAL DIVISION
	:	
v.	:	PHILADELPHIA COUNTY
	:	
KEENAN BONDS	:	CP-51-CR-0014071-2011
	:	1989 EDA 2013


STATEMENT OF MATTERS COMPLAINED OF PURSUANT TO Pa. R. A. P. 1925(b)

To the Honorable Judges of this Court:

Keenan Bonds, by and through counsel, respectfully presents the following as issues for appeal to the Superior Court:

1. The witness' credibility was called into question. Therefore, Appellant raises a weight of the evidence claim.
2. The Court's sentence of 4 to 10 years state incarceration was greater than necessary under 42 Pa. C. S. § 9781(d) and 42 Pa. C. S. § 9721(b). Therefore, Appellant raises a manifestly excessive sentence claim.

Date: October 3, 2013



Jennifer A. Santiago, Esquire
Attorney for Appellant


CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Jennifer A. Santiago, Esquire, certify that a true and correct copy of the within Statement of Matters Complained of Pursuant to 1925(b) which has been filed on behalf of Appellant will be served on the following individuals on the 3rd day of October, 2013 via electronic filing.

Honorable Donna M. Woelpper
1401 Criminal Justice Center
1301 Filbert Street
Philadelphia, PA 19107

Hugh Burns, Esquire
Philadelphia District Attorney's Office
Three South Penn Square
Philadelphia, PA 19107
Attorney for the Appellee

Date: October 3, 2013



Jennifer A. Santiago, Esquire
Attorney for Appellant

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
TRIAL DIVISION – CRIMINAL SECTION


COMMONWEALTH OF	:	CP-51-CR-0014071-2011
PENNSYLVANIA	:	
	:	
	:	SUPERIOR COURT
vs.	:	NO. 1989 EDA 2013
	:	
	:	
KEENAN BONDS	:	

PROOF OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am this 12^m day of November, 2013, serving the foregoing Opinion on the persons indicated below, by first class mail:

Jennifer A. Santiago, Esquire
Land Title Building
100 South Broad Street, Ste. 1419
Philadelphia, PA 19110

Hugh Burns, Assistant District Attorney
Chief, Appeals Unit
District Attorney's Office
Three South Penn Square
Philadelphia, PA 19107


Alyson M. Walkenstein, Esquire
Law Clerk to the Honorable
Donna M. Woelpper