[J-44-2002] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA MIDDLE DISTRICT

KEVIN CHOW, A MINOR, BY AND : No. 68 MAP 2001 THROUGH HIS PARENTS AND :

NATURAL GUARDIANS, CHI CHOW

AND JENNY CHOW, AND IN THEIR : Appeal from the Order of the Superior OWN RIGHT : Court entered 5/24/00 at 2552 EDA 1999

which affirmed the order of the DelawareCounty Court of Common Pleas, Civil

: Division, entered on 7/12/99 at 95-13125

BRUCE J. ROSEN, M.D., DEBORAH
BIETER SCHULTZ, M.D., JEROME B.
GOLDSTEIN, M.D., PENN WOMEN'S
HEALTH ASSOCIATES, P.C. AND
PENNSYLVANIA PROPERTY AND
CASUALTY INSURANCE GUARANTY

CASUALTY INSURANCE GUARANTY ASSOCIATION, INTERVENOR

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APPEAL OF: INDEPENDENCE BLUE

CROSS : ARGUED: April 8, 2002

DISSENTING OPINION

MR. JUSTICE SAYLOR	DECIDED:	December 19,	2002
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In <u>Bell v. Slezak,</u> Pa, A.2d (2002), I have set forth the position
that the PPCIGA Act does not bar a medical malpractice plaintiff's claim against a
defendant-physician or foreclose liability, and that the non-duplication of recovery
provision does not relieve PPCIGA of its payment obligation in relation to the doctor's
covered claim. See id. at, A.2d at, slip op. at 7-9 (Saylor, J., dissenting).
The supporting rationale centers upon the nature of the parties' claims under the
PPCIGA Act PPCIGA possessed a complete defense against direct payment on the
plaintiffs' potential third-party claim, see id. (citing 40 P.S. §991.1803(b)(2)); however, it

had no such defense against the doctor's first-party claim predicated upon his insurance contract with PIC. See id.

Applying this reasoning to the present case, the orders of the Superior Court and the common pleas court should not be sustained. The common pleas court simply should not have denied the subrogee, Independence Blue Cross, leave to intervene or approved a settlement that was designed to extinguish the insurer's rights, particularly where the plaintiffs' cause against Dr. Rosen for the medical expenses attributable to Independence Blue Cross should remain viable. See Bell, Pa. at Pa. at A.2d at Slip op. at 7-9 (Saylor, J., dissenting). While the decision to permit a reduction of settlement proceeds based upon an unsettled legal theory may generally be within the prerogative of the parties to the litigation, Pennsylvania courts frown on attempts to utilize the settlement process as a mechanism to defeat subrogation interests. See, e.g., Thompson v. WCAB, 801 A.2d 635, 639 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002).

Mr. Justice Nigro joins this dissenting opinion.