Appellant's motion denied, State's motion granted; appeal dismissed and Memorandum Opinion filed March 9, 2017.



In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-16-00302-CR

JULIO CESAR MACIAS-SANCHEZ, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 177th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 1482963

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Julio Cesar Macias-Sanchez was indicted for aggravated assault of a family member, a first-degree felony. He pleaded guilty without a sentencing recommendation, but with the agreement that he waived his right to appeal in exchange for the State waiving its right to a jury trial. Appellant has filed a motion to retain the appeal, and the State has filed a motion to dismiss the appeal. Both motions have been on file for more than 10 days, and neither party has filed a response to the other party's motion.

The trial court entered a certification of the defendant's right to appeal in which the court certified that appellant waived his right of appeal. *See* Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2). The trial court's certification is included in the record on appeal. *See* Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(d). The records support the trial court's certifications. *See Dears v. State*, 154 S.W.3d 610, 615 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

The right to appeal may be waived, *see* Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.14(a) (West 2015), and such a waiver is valid if made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. *Ex parte Delaney*, 207 S.W.3d 794, 796–97 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). A waiver of appeal prior to sentencing may be valid if it is bargained for—that is, if the State gives some consideration for the waiver, even if a sentence is not agreed upon. *Id.* at 798; *see also Ex parte Broadway*, 301 S.W.3d 694, 699 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).

The record shows the State's waiver of its right to a jury trial was bargained for. The plea documents state, "In exchange for the State waiving its right to a jury trial, the Defendant waives his right to appeal." *Contra Jenkins v. State*, 495 S.W.3d 347, 351 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 3, 2016, no pet.) (State's <u>consent</u> to waiver of jury trial, required by Code of Criminal Procedure, was not bargained for and therefore was not consideration for appellant's waiver of right to appeal).

Appellant filed a motion for new trial in which he alleges his plea was not voluntarily made. The voluntariness of a plea cannot be raised on direct appeal from a plea-bargained felony conviction. *Cooper v. State*, 45 S.W.3d 77 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); *Theus v. State*, Nos. 14-15-01001-CR, 14-15-01002-CR, __S.W.3d __, slip. op. at 2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 7, 2017, n.p.h.). A motion for new trial may not be used to circumvent *Cooper. Whitfield v.*

State, 111 S.W.3d 786 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2003, pet. ref'd); *accord Estrada v. State*, 149 S.W.3d 280, 285 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. ref'd); *Williams v. State*, No. 14-15-00431-CR, 2016 WL 4146108, *1 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 4, 2016, n.p.h.) (mem. op.) (per curiam) (not designated for publication); *Feathers v. State*, No. 14-02-00188-CR, 14-02-00189-CR, 2002 WL 1958274, *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 22, 2002, no pet.) (mem. op.) (per curiam) (not designated for publication).

Accordingly, appellant's motion to retain the appeal, filed August 1, 2016, is **DENIED**; the State's motion to dismiss, filed January 20, 2017, is **GRANTED**; and the appeal is **DISMISSED**.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Boyce, Jamison, and Brown. Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).