

**In The**  
***Court of Appeals***  
***Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont***

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**NO. 09-18-00299-CV**

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**IN THE INTEREST OF I.J.G.**

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**On Appeal from the 317th District Court**  
**Jefferson County, Texas**  
**Trial Cause No. C-230,177**

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**MEMORANDUM OPINION**

R.G. appeals from an order terminating her parental rights to her son, I.J.G.<sup>1,2</sup> The trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence, statutory grounds exist for termination of R.G.'s parental rights, and termination of her rights would be in I.J.G.'s best interest. *See* Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O), (2) (West Supp. 2018).

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<sup>1</sup> To protect the identity of the minor, we use the initials for the child and his parents. *See* Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2).

<sup>2</sup> The Order of Termination also terminated the parental rights of I.J.G.'s father, V.O., however, V.O. is not a party to this appeal.

Appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel submitted a brief in which counsel contends there are no meritorious grounds to be advanced on appeal. *See Anders v. California*, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967); *In re L.D.T.*, 161 S.W.3d 728, 731 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, no pet.). The brief provides counsel’s professional evaluation of the record. Counsel certified Appellant was served with a copy of the *Anders* brief filed on her behalf. This Court notified Appellant of her right to file a *pro se* response, as well as the deadline for filing the response. This Court did not receive a *pro se* response from Appellant. We have independently reviewed the appellate record and counsel’s brief, and we agree any appeal would be frivolous. We find no arguable error requiring us to appoint new counsel to re-brief this appeal. *Cf. Stafford v. State*, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating R.G.’s parental rights. We deny the motion to withdraw filed by R.G.’s court-appointed appellate counsel, because an attorney’s duty extends through the exhaustion or waiver of all appeals. *See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 107.016(3)(B)* (West Supp. 2018); *In re P.M.*, 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 (Tex. 2016). In the event R.G. decides to pursue an appeal to the Supreme Court of Texas, counsel’s obligations to R.G. can be met “by filing a petition for review that satisfies the standards for an *Anders* brief.” *See In re P.M.*, 520 S.W.3d at 27–28.

AFFIRMED.

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CHARLES KREGER  
Justice

Submitted on October 29, 2018  
Opinion Delivered November 8, 2018

Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Horton, JJ.