



**In The  
Court of Appeals  
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo**

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No. 07-16-00234-CV

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**IN THE INTEREST OF D.S. AND N.S., CHILDREN**

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On Appeal from the 320th District Court  
Potter County, Texas  
Trial Court No. 79,505-D, Honorable Carry Baker, Presiding

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August 5, 2016

**MEMORANDUM OPINION**

Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and PIRTLE, JJ.

T.A. had her parental rights to D.S. and N.S. terminated and appealed from that order. Her appointed counsel filed a motion to withdraw, together with an *Anders*<sup>1</sup> brief. In the latter, counsel certified that the record was diligently searched and that the appeal was without merit. Appellate counsel also attached a copy of a letter sent to T.A. informing her of her right to file a *pro se* response. T.A.. was provided a copy of the appellate record on a disk, according to the letter. By letter dated July 14, 2016, this court also notified appellant of her right to file her own brief or response by August 3,

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<sup>1</sup> *Anders v. California*, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967).

2016, if she wished to do so. T.A. filed a response wherein she claimed the evidence was false and she should be entitled to have her children returned to her.

In compliance with the principles enunciated in *Anders*, appellate counsel discussed potential areas for appeal which included the sufficiency of the evidence to support the statutory grounds found for termination and whether termination was in the best interests of the children. Counsel then explained that the termination was supported by sufficient evidence. Per our obligation specified in *In re D.D.*, 279 S.W.3d 849, 850 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, pet. denied) (*citing Bledsoe v. State*, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)), we too reviewed the appellate record in search of arguable issues for appeal along with T.A.'s response. None were found. Thus, we concur with counsel's representation that the appeal is meritless due to the absence of reversible error.

Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed. We deny counsel's motion to withdraw. See *In re P.M.*, \_\_\_ S.W.3d \_\_\_, 2016 Tex. LEXIS 236, at \*7-8 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam) (holding that 1) the right to appointed counsel under § 107.013(a)(1) of the Family Code includes the exhaustion of appellate remedies through the Texas Supreme Court, 2) counsel's belief that his client has no grounds to seek further review is not alone good cause to permit counsel's withdrawal, and 3) appointed counsel's obligations can be satisfied by filing a petition for review with the Supreme Court comporting with *Anders*).

Brian Quinn  
Chief Justice