



**In The
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana**

No. 06-17-00078-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF A.G.-U., A CHILD

On Appeal from the 196th District Court
Hunt County, Texas
Trial Court No. 83654

Before Morriss, C.J., Moseley and Burgess, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Morriss

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (Department) filed a petition to terminate Father's parental rights to his child, Ameila.¹ After a bench trial, the 196th Judicial District Court of Hunt County terminated Father's parental rights after finding (1) that under Section 161.001(b)(1)(M), he had his parent-child relationship terminated with respect to another child,² (2) that under Section 161.001(b)(1)(O), he failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that established the actions necessary for him to obtain Ameila's return after she was left in conservatorship of the Department for not less than nine months as a result of her removal for abuse or neglect, and (3) that termination of his parental rights was in Ameila's best interest. *See* TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(M), (O), (b)(2) (West Supp. 2016).

In his sole point of error on appeal, Father challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the termination of his parental rights under Ground (O) of Section 161.001(b)(1). However, Father challenges neither the trial court's finding under Ground (M) nor the best-interest finding.

The trial court terminated Father's parental rights under Grounds (M) and (O) of Section 161.001(b)(1) of the Texas Family Code. "Only one predicate finding under Section 161.001[b]

¹To protect the confidentiality of the children involved, this Court will refer to all involved parties by titles or fictitious names. *See* TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b)(C)(2).

²In making a predicate finding under Ground (M), the trial court determined that Father's parental rights to another child were terminated because his conduct violated (a) Section 161.001(b)(1)(D), meaning that he knowingly placed or knowingly allowed that child to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered the child's physical or emotional well-being, (b) Section 161.001(b)(1)(E), meaning that he engaged in conduct or knowingly placed that child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangered the child's physical or emotional well-being, or (c) a substantially equivalent provision of the law of another state. *See* TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(M).

(1) is necessary to support a judgment of termination when there is also a finding that termination is in the child’s best interest.” *In re O.R.F.*, 417 S.W.3d 24, 37 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, pet. denied) (citing *In re A.V.*, 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003); *In re K.W.*, 335 S.W.3d 767, 769 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2011, no pet.)). When the trial court finds multiple predicate grounds, we will affirm if any one ground is supported by sufficient evidence. *K.W.*, 335 S.W.3d at 769.

Here, Father does not challenge the trial court’s finding under Ground (M). Since this ground alone can support the trial court’s termination order, we need not “review legal and factual sufficiency arguments as to the other grounds.” *In re J.F.G., III*, 500 S.W.3d 554, 560 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2016, no pet.) (citing *K.W.*, 335 S.W.3d at 769). Accordingly, we overrule Father’s sole point of error.

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Josh R. Morriss, III
Chief Justice

Date Submitted: November 14, 2017
Date Decided: November 15, 2017