



NUMBER 13-15-00183-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

STEPHEN CLARK,

Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee.

**On appeal from the 347th District Court
of Nueces County, Texas.**

MEMORANDUM OPINION

**Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Rodriguez and Garza
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Valdez**

Appellant, Stephen Clark, pleaded guilty to three counts of sexual assault of a child, a second-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011 (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.). The trial court deferred adjudication and placed Clark on community supervision for ten years. Subsequently, the State filed a motion to revoke Clark's community supervision based on several allegations that Clark had violated various conditions of his community supervision. Clark pleaded "true" to the State's allegation

that he had violated the conditions of community supervision by testing positive for amphetamines. A hearing was held, and the trial court found that all of the State's allegations were true. The trial court revoked Clark's community supervision, adjudicated his guilt, and sentenced him to twenty years' incarceration on each count to run concurrently. This appeal followed. Clark's court-appointed counsel has filed an *Anders* brief. See *Anders v. California*, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). We affirm.

I. **ANDERS BRIEF**

Pursuant to *Anders v. California*, Clark's court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief and a motion to withdraw with this Court, stating that his review of the record yielded no grounds of reversible error upon which an appeal can be predicated. See *id.* Counsel's brief meets the requirements of *Anders* as it presents a professional evaluation demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to advance on appeal. See *In re Schulman*, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) ("In Texas, an *Anders* brief need not specifically advance 'arguable' points of error if counsel finds none, but it must provide record references to the facts and procedural history and set out pertinent legal authorities.") (citing *Hawkins v. State*, 112 S.W.3d 340, 343–44 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.)); *Stafford v. State*, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

In compliance with *High v. State*, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978) and *Kelly v. State*, 436 S.W.3d 313, 319–22 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014), Clark's counsel carefully discussed why, under controlling authority, there is no reversible error in the trial court's judgment. Clark's counsel has also informed this Court that Clark has been (1) notified that counsel has filed an *Anders* brief and a motion to withdraw; (2) provided with copies of both pleadings; (3) informed of his rights to file a pro se response, review the record preparatory to filing that response, and seek discretionary review if we concluded that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) provided with a form motion for pro se

access to the appellate record with instructions to file the motion within ten days. See *Anders*, 386 U.S. at 744; *Kelly*, 436 S.W.3d at 319–20, *Stafford*, 813 S.W.2d at 510 n.3; see also *In re Schulman*, 252 S.W.3d at 409 n.23. More than an adequate period of time has passed, and Clark has not filed a pro se response.¹

II. INDEPENDENT REVIEW

Upon receiving an *Anders* brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. *Penson v. Ohio*, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988). We have reviewed the entire record and counsel’s brief, and we have found nothing that would arguably support an appeal.² See *id.* at 827–28 (“Due to the nature of *Anders* briefs, by indicating in the opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record for reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the requirement of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); *Stafford*, 813 S.W.2d at 509. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

III. MOTION TO WITHDRAW

Upon receiving an *Anders* brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. *Penson v. Ohio*, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988). In accordance with *Anders*, Clark’s attorney has asked this Court for permission to withdraw as counsel. See *Anders*, 386 U.S. at 744; see also *In re Schulman*, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17 (citing *Jeffery v. State*, 903 S.W.2d 776, 779–80 (Tex.

¹ The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that “the pro se response need not comply with the rules of appellate procedure in order to be considered. Rather, the response should identify for the court those issues which the indigent appellant believes the court should consider in deciding whether the case presents any meritorious issues.” *In re Schulman*, 252 S.W.3d 403, 409 n.23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (quoting *Wilson v. State*, 955 S.W.2d 693, 696–97 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, no pet.)).

² We note that a transcript of the trial court’s hearing on Clark’s motion for reconsideration and new trial was not a part of the record when Clark’s trial counsel reviewed the record and drafted the *Anders* brief and motion to withdraw. And, based upon our independent review of the entire record, including the transcript, we have found nothing concerning the trial court’s denial of Clark’s motion for reconsideration and new trial that would arguably support an appeal.

App.—Dallas 1995, no pet.) (“[I]f an attorney believes the appeal is frivolous, he must withdraw from representing the appellant. To withdraw from representation, the appointed attorney must file a motion to withdraw accompanied by a brief showing the appellate court that the appeal is frivolous.”) (citations omitted)). We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. Within five days of the date of this Court’s opinion, counsel is ordered to send a copy of this opinion and this Court’s judgment to Clark and to advise him of his right to file a petition for discretionary review.³ See TEX. R. APP. P. 48.4; see also *In re Schulman*, 252 S.W.3d at 412 n.35; *Ex parte Owens*, 206 S.W.3d 670, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

/s/ Rogelio Valdez
ROGELIO VALDEZ
Chief Justice

Do Not Publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed this the
19th day of May, 2016.

³ No substitute counsel will be appointed. Should Clark wish to seek further review of this case by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, he must either retain an attorney to file a petition for discretionary review or file a pro se petition for discretionary review. Any petition for discretionary review must be filed within thirty days from the date of either this opinion or the last timely motion for rehearing or timely motion for en banc reconsideration that was overruled by this Court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.2. A petition for discretionary review must be filed with the clerk of the Court of Criminal Appeals. See *id.* R. 68.3. Any petition for discretionary review should comply with the requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 68.4. See *id.* R. 68.4.