



NUMBER 13-18-00013-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

MATTHEW PATRICK AGNEW,

Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee.

**On appeal from the 36th District Court
of San Patricio County, Texas.**

MEMORANDUM OPINION

**Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Hinojosa and Tijerina
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Contreras**

Appellant Matthew Patrick Agnew entered a guilty plea before the trial court and was convicted of assault family violence, a third-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(b). The trial court assessed punishment at ten years' incarceration in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice–Institutional Division, suspended for six years of community supervision. Agnew appealed, and his court-appointed appellate counsel has

filed an *Anders* brief stating there are no arguable grounds for appeal. See *Anders v. California*, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). We affirm.

I. **ANDERS BRIEF**

Agnew’s appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw and a brief in support thereof in which he states that he has diligently reviewed the entire record and has found no non-frivolous grounds for appeal. See *id.*; *High v. State*, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978). Counsel’s brief meets the requirements of *Anders* as it presents a thorough, professional evaluation of the record showing why there are no arguable grounds for advancing an appeal. See *In re Schulman*, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding) (“In Texas, an *Anders* brief need not specifically advance ‘arguable’ points of error if counsel finds none, but it must provide record references to the facts and procedural history and set out pertinent legal authorities.”) (citing *Hawkins v. State*, 112 S.W.3d 340, 343–44 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2003, no pet.)); *Stafford v. State*, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

In compliance with *High v. State*, 573 S.W.2d at 813, and *Kelly v. State*, 436 S.W.3d 313, 319–20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014), counsel carefully discussed why, under controlling authority, there is no reversible error in the trial court’s judgments. Agnew’s counsel has also informed this Court that he has: (1) notified Agnew that he has filed an *Anders* brief and a motion to withdraw; (2) provided Agnew with copies of both filings; (3) informed Agnew of his rights to file a pro se response,¹ to review the record preparatory

¹ The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that “the pro se response need not comply with the rules of appellate procedure in order to be considered. Rather, the response should identify for the court those issues which the indigent appellant believes the court should consider in deciding whether the case presents any meritorious issues.” *In re Schulman*, 252 S.W.3d 403, 409 n. 23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).

to filing that response, and to seek discretionary review in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals if this Court finds that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) provided Agnew with a form motion for pro se access to the appellate record with instructions to file the motion in this Court. See *Anders*, 386 U.S. at 744; *Kelly*, 436 S.W.3d at 319–20; see also *In re Schulman*, 252 S.W.3d at 409 n.23. More than adequate time has passed, and Agnew has not filed a pro se response.

II. INDEPENDENT REVIEW

Upon receiving an *Anders* brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. *Penson v. Ohio*, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988). We have reviewed the record and counsel’s brief, and we have found no reversible error. See *Bledsoe v. State*, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“Due to the nature of *Anders* briefs, by indicating in the opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record for reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the requirement of Texas Rule of Appellant Procedure 47.1.”); *Stafford*, 813 S.W.2d at 509.

III. MOTION TO WITHDRAW

In accordance with *Anders*, Agnew’s counsel has asked this Court for permission to withdraw. See *Anders*, 386 U.S. at 744; see also *In re Schulman*, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17 (citing *Jeffery v. State*, 903 S.W.3d 776, 779–80 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, no pet.) (“[I]f an attorney believes the appeal is frivolous, he must withdraw from representing the appellant. To withdraw from representation, the appointed attorney must file a motion to withdraw accompanied by a brief showing the appellate court that the appeal is frivolous.”) (citations omitted)). We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.

Within five days of the date of this opinion, we order counsel to send a copy of this opinion and judgment to Agnew and to advise him of his right to file any petition for discretionary review.² See TEX. R. APP. P. 48.4; see also *In re Schulman*, 252 S.W.3d at 412 n.35; *Ex parte Owens*, 206 S.W.3d 670, 67 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

IV. CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court's judgment.

DORI CONTRERAS
Chief Justice

Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed the 10th
day of October, 2019.

² No substitute counsel will be appointed. If Agnew seeks further review by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, he must either retain an attorney to file a petition for discretionary review or file a pro se petition for discretionary review. Any petition for discretionary review must be filed within thirty days from the date of either this opinion or the last timely motion for rehearing or timely motion for en banc reconsideration that was overruled by this Court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.2. A petition for discretionary review must be filed with the clerk of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, see *id.* R. 68.3(a), and must comply with the requirements of the Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure. See *id.* R. 68.4.