

favorable to the prevailing party below, disregarding the effect of any modifying evidence.” Coates v. Coates, 171 Vt. 519, 520 (2000) (mem.) (quotation omitted).

The trial court must issue an anti-stalking order against a defendant if it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has stalked the plaintiff. 12 V.S.A. § 5133(d). Stalking means “to engage purposefully in a course of conduct directed at a specific person” that would “cause a reasonable person to[] fear for his or her safety” or “suffer substantial emotional distress.” 12 V.S.A. § 5131(6). A “course of conduct” is defined as “two or more acts over a period of time, however short, in which a person follows, monitors, surveils, threatens, or makes threats about another person, or interferes with another person’s property.” Id. § 5131(1)(A).

On appeal, defendant first argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the court’s findings and conclusions. Defendant argues that: the trial court failed to consider or give adequate weight to defendant’s testimony that she only cut trees on her own property; there was inadequate evidence to support the court’s finding that defendant threatened to burn items on plaintiff’s property; and defendant testified that plaintiff, not defendant, had been the aggressor. The trial court’s findings about defendant’s conduct and threats are supported by plaintiff’s testimony. Although defendant offered a different version of events, the court evidently did not find her testimony persuasive. “As the trier of fact, it [is] the province of the trial court to determine the credibility of the witnesses and weigh the persuasiveness of the evidence.” Cabot v. Cabot, 166 Vt. 485, 497 (1997). Because the court’s findings are based on its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, we will not disturb them on appeal.

The court’s findings, in turn, are sufficient to support its conclusion that defendant engaged in stalking. The court found that defendant had, on more than one occasion, interfered with plaintiff’s property, threatened to damage her property, and acted in a physically threatening manner toward plaintiff, and that this conduct caused plaintiff substantial emotional distress. These conclusions are supported by the findings and required the court to issue an order against stalking. See 12 V.S.A. § 5133(d).

Defendant further argues that her due process right to a fair hearing was violated because her attorney failed to have her testify during the hearing below and because plaintiff’s attorney had a conflict of interest. These claims do not provide a basis to reverse the decision below. The record shows that defendant did testify at the hearing, for roughly the same amount of time as plaintiff. Moreover, defendant did not have a right to effective assistance of counsel in this proceeding. See State v. Clark, 164 Vt. 626, 627 (1995) (mem.) (“A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel rests on the constitutional right to counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. At a proceeding where there is no constitutional right to counsel, such a claim is inapplicable.” (citation omitted)); see also, e.g., Emery v. Emery, No. 2006-299, 2007 WL 5313349, *1 (Vt. May 1, 2007) (unpub. mem.) [<https://perma.cc/67QF-KRTU>] (rejecting wife’s argument that she received ineffective assistance of counsel in divorce proceeding and noting that “[a]part from showing a violation of due process in certain types of civil cases involving a constitutional liberty interest, there is no constitutional or statutory right to effective assistance of counsel in civil cases, and the only potential remedy is a malpractice suit against the attorney”). As for defendant’s claim that plaintiff’s attorney had a conflict of interest that should have disqualified her from representing plaintiff, defendant did not request the attorney’s disqualification below and therefore has failed to preserve this claim for our review. O’Rourke v. Lunde, 2014 VT 88, ¶ 17, 197 Vt. 360 (“Generally, issues that are not presented to the trial court cannot be raised on appeal.”); In re B.L., 145 Vt. 586, 590 (1985) (holding that failure to

move for disqualification of judge based on alleged personal bias constituted waiver of issue on appeal).

Affirmed.

BY THE COURT:

Harold E. Eaton, Jr., Associate Justice

Karen R. Carroll, Associate Justice

William D. Cohen, Associate Justice